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1 Introduction 
Some years ago an arbitral tribunal under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)
1
 decided in a case between the American investor S.D. Myers and 
the government of Canada regarding an export ban on toxic waste that aversely affected 
the investor. Inter alia, the arbitral tribunal considered whether the ban was in breach of 
Canada‟s obligations under Article 1105 of the NAFTA. Article 1105 states that the state 
parties must comply with basic norms of international law, including “fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security”. The tribunal held that such “determination 
must be made in the light of the high measure of deference that international law 
generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own 
borders.”2 What is the nature of this “measure of deference”? To what extent can it be 
defined? Is it always high? What is its purpose and function? And most importantly: 
What are its limits? 
 
The aim of this thesis is to shed some light on these issues. In order to do so, I will be 
analyzing relevant awards under NAFTA, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other 
treaties that compose the system of investment treaty arbitration.
3
 I will consider this 
“measure of deference” under what I believe is its more familiar name, the “margin of 
appreciation.”4 
 
                                                 
 
1
 17 December 1992, U.S.-Canada-Mexico (entered into force 1 January 1994), available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp. Hereinafter NAFTA. 
2
 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL. (NAFTA), First Partial Award, 13 November 2000.para. 263. 
3
 I will also be using the term “international investment law” without meaning anything substantially 
different. See Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer: Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 2,3.  
 6 
The most prominent advocate of the margin of appreciation doctrine at the international 
level has been the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The concept is not stated 
in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
5
 but has been developed through 
the Court‟s jurisprudence. According to one scholar, the ECHR in this respect “builds on 
the equilibrium between national sovereignty and the exercise of international authority 
in pursuit of human rights protection.”6  
 
I argue that such equilibrium can be identified – at least in principle - in most treaties, 
regardless of what field of international law the treaty covers. The scales of national 
sovereignty concerns and international authority may weigh unequally in the different 
fields, however, so that in some fields the margin is barely recognizable, or not at all. It is 
the topic of this thesis to identify within international investment law any equilibrium 
between national sovereignty and international authority in pursuit of legal protection of 
the investments of aliens. 
 
Some authors have argued that a recent trend in international law have seen the margin of 
appreciation doctrine emerge as an important factor in different branches of international 
law.
7
 To my knowledge, however, there is no direct treatment of this concept within the 
field of international investment law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4
 I am not alone in this approach, see Yuval Shany: ”Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in 
International Law?” 16 European Journal of International Law (2006), 907-940, 930. 
5
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, in 
force 3 September 1953, Eur T.S. No. 5, 213 UNTS 221. 
6
 Marius Emberland: The Human Rights of Companies - Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection, 
(Oxford University Press 2006) 161. 
7
 Shany (2006) and Jean Pierre Cot: “The Law of the Sea and the Margin of Appreciation” in Tafsir Malick 
Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.): Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 389-403. 
 7 
I will examine to what extent the limitations international investment law impose on the 
sovereign state‟s ability to draw up and execute legislative and administrative measures 
that affect foreign investors, are confined by the treaty tribunal‟s application of the 
margin of appreciation as a standard of review, an interpretative method. The degree to 
which a treaty tribunal applies this method can be viewed as the degree to which the 
state‟s regulatory powers are “judicializied” and “internationalized”,8 as a result of the 
globalization of states‟ economical relations.9  
 
It is submitted that application of the margin of appreciation as an interpretative 
technique can contribute to the search for a viable balance between the conflicting 
interests between national values, democracy, national sovereignty and policy choices on 
the one hand and the investment protection offered foreign investors on the other. This 
balance can in part be defined by the principle of proportionality, which is used by courts 
and tribunals partly to prevent abuse of the state‟s regulatory power “to further some 
narrow political or economic interest.”10 I will examine this claim in connection with the 
use of the principle of proportionality by investment treaty tribunals. 
                                                 
 
8
 Anne-Marie Slaughter: “International Law and International Relations” Recueil des Cours 2000 177-181. 
The term ”juridification” is often used synonymously with ”judicialization”, see Lars Chr Blichner and 
Anders Molander: "What is "juridification"?" (2005) Arena Working Paper No.14, March 2005. In this 
context both indicate a descriptive process where formerly political fields are being obtained by legal 
institutions. 
9
  G. Ietto-Gillies: "Different conceptual frameworks for the assessment of the degree of 
internationalization: an empirical analysis of various indices for the top 100 transnational corporations" 7 
Transnational Corporations, (1998) 17-40. and Spyros Economides and Peter Wilson: The Economic 
Factor in International Relations ( I.B. Tauris 2002) 196, 197. 
10
 Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo: "Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 'Regulatory 
Taking' in International Law" 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2001) 811-847, 811.. 830, 
referring to The Trustees of the Late Duke of Westminster’s Estate v. UK (1983) 5 EHRR 440 at 456. The 
argument seems to be derived from the applicants‟ claim, not, as the authors argue, from the ECtHR‟s 
decision. Furthermore, the decision was an admissibility application before the European Commision of 
Human Rights. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I believe the argument is reasonable. For example, 
the result in the ICSID arbitration between Tecmed and Mexico seem to be based on the fact that the 
refusal to renew a permit was based not primarily on environmental and public health reasons, but rather on 
local community opposition to the operation of the applicant‟s property. Técnicas Medioambientales 
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In furtherance of the search for this “viable balance” an initial answer to the last question 
posed above – the function of the margin of appreciation – will be treated rather as an 
underlying assumption of this thesis, reflected in its title. I make the claim that one 
important function of the margin appreciation and the principle of proportionality is to 
help sustain the legitimacy of the system of investment treaty arbitration.
11
 I make a more 
detailed argument regarding the importance of this role below. Suffice here to say that I 
have come to believe there is ample room for such helpful legal techniques if they can 
contribute in that respect. 
 
1.1 Method 
Because there is an abundance of legal issues that can arise in state-investor arbitration – 
both of a procedural and substantial nature – and because the number of awards issued 
only in recent years have become so extensive as to prohibit inclusion of all the material 
in any meaningful way within the restraints of time and space available for this study, it 
has been necessary to confine the analysis at hand. For reasons pertaining to the 
theoretical framework of the thesis, I have chosen to analyze awards where the legal issue 
(or more often one of the legal issues) includes alleged deprivation (expropriations, both 
direct and indirect, and similar measures) of the Claimant‟s investment by the respondent 
state (or authorities attributable to it) in such a way that it amounts to a breach of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2. (Spain/Mexico BIT), Award, 29 
May 2003. See discussion of the award below. 
11
 By function, then, I mean the purpose for applying these techniques. As often in law, the question of its 
function or purpose is a question of where one sets the limit of one‟s perspective. Compare, for instance, 
tax treaties, whose aim are inter alia to reduce double taxation of foreigners (i.e. both in their home state 
and in the state where they reside, work or invest). Why is this important for the state parties? Because if 
the foreigner knows that he must pay for instance income tax to both the country where he is working and 
to that of which he is a national, he is not likely to undertake an activity whose importance is greater to the 
state parties than taxing him. Likewise, the function of investment treaties can be said to be either to protect 
foreign investors or to attract FDI to the home state or to maximise economic growth in the home state or to 
maximise the long term welfare of the citizens of the home state, etc. All these are equally true.  
 9 
international law. I believe expropriation cases in investment treaty arbitration are well 
suited to examine sovereignty-related legal reasoning, because they involve claims for 
large sums of money from foreigners deprived of their wealth by a state seeking to 
benefit its citizens. 
 
The body of international law allegedly violated is typically investment treaties, but other 
parts of international law are relevant as well. If follows, then, that I regard investment 
treaties as part of international law,
12
 or as a sub field of international law, governed by 
the special purpose treaties mentioned above as well as by general (“applicable”) 
international law.
13
 There is little doubt that arbitral tribunals need to “apply international 
law as a whole to the claim, and not the provisions of the” investment treaty in 
isolation.
14
 
 
The method I have chosen consists of analysis of relevant case law, mostly in the field of 
investment treaty arbitration.
15
 There is no formal doctrine of precedent in investment 
                                                 
 
12
 McLachlan (2008). At least that is true for interpretative matters, see ibid 370. 
13
 Whether one regards international investment law as a branch of something general (whether 
international economic law or international law) or as a system sui generis is today of little importance. 
Dolzer & Schreuer (2008) 2. The most important procedural rules governing investment treaty arbitration 
can be found in the ICSID Convention (see note 41 below). Article 42 (1) reads: “The Tribunal shall decide 
a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such 
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules 
on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.” For an updated treatment 
of the requirements herein, see: Campbell McLachlan “Investment Treaties and General International Law” 
51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2008) 361-401. 
14
 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 (Malaysia/Chile BIT). 
Decision on Annulment, 21 March 2007, para 61. 
15
 Relevant practice can be found in publications such as International Law Materials (ILM) and 
International Law Reports, but increasingly they are available online, either at the webpage of the court or 
tribunal (such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the ICJ and the ECtHR) or at other, specialized sites such 
as the University of Victoria‟s http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ (awards by investment treaty tribunals), Todd Weiler‟s 
www.naftaclaims.com, www.investmentclaims.com by Oxford University Press and Kluwer‟s arbitration 
site http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/arbitration/Default.aspx. I have utilized both these sources of 
information for accessing the material I refer to.  
 10 
treaty arbitration, but the tribunals rely on earlier decisions by other tribunals whenever 
possible.
16
 Some legal questions – in this connection particularly those concerning so 
called indirect expropriation – can be illuminated by decisions from other tribunals, in 
particular the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, and international courts such as the Permanent 
Court of Justice, the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights. These are all valuable sources of international investment law for their “actuality 
and responsiveness to individual facts” rather than as authority.17 But even within 
international investment treaty arbitration it is fundamental that “each tribunal is 
sovereign, and may retain . . . a different solution for resolving the same problem”.18 That 
being said, my working assumption is the “simple initial observation that while tribunals 
are not strictly bound to follow previous decisions, they do so in many instances thereby 
creating a de facto doctrine of precedent.”19 With this in mind, I seek to explore the legal 
reasoning of investment treaty tribunals in the connection of the margin of appreciation 
and the principle of proportionality. 
 
These are both linked to the concept of sovereignty in international law, but even more 
so, perhaps, to the concept of sovereignty as a political factor. A margin of discretion 
given national authorities eases the external constraints of a treaty and its dispute 
settlement mechanism. The principle of proportionality can be regarded as a technique 
for judges and arbitrators to monitor even this exercise of constrained freedom.  
 
                                                 
 
16
 Christoph Schreuer and M. Weiniger: ”Conversations Across Cases – Is There a Doctrine of Precedent in 
Investment Arbitration?” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law  (Oxford University Press forthcoming), available at: 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/text03.html. 
17
 See Ivar Alvik: Contracting with Sovereignty – The Structure of Commitment in International Investment 
Arbitration (Universitet i Oslo 2006) 22. 
18
 AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17 (US/Argentina BIT), Decision 
on Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005. 
19
 Matthew Weiniger: “Editorial: Special issue on Precedent in Investment Arbitration”, 5 Transnational 
Dispute Management (May 2008) 
 11 
One can hardly read the many publications or websites concerned with investment treaty 
arbitration for a long time – whether from the perspective of NGOs or that of professional 
arbitrators, lawyers and academics –without noticing that there is much debate, both 
external and internal, about matters that concern precisely the same contents of 
sovereignty. For example, this is the case in the question under international investment 
law of when regulation becomes expropriation. Such debates, while important for their 
own sake, contributed to this thesis as well, in the sense that they fuelled my belief in the 
value of another theoretical level. This is the function of the part of this thesis concerned 
with legitimacy. A consequence is that the doctrinal analysis in the thesis will be delayed, 
but not, I hope, in vain. In the context of legitimacy outlined above, except for what is 
explicitly written, no normative claims are intended. 
 
1.2 Outline of thesis 
As it is necessary in order to understand the special role the margin of appreciation and 
the principle of proportionality play therein, the following chapter (Chapter 2) will 
contain a brief overview of the system of investment treaty arbitration.  In Chapter 3, I 
examine the concept of legitimacy and its function in investment treaty arbitration, 
followed by a more detailed chapter on the role of the margin of appreciation and the 
principle of proportionality and their relevance to investment treaty arbitration (Chapter 
4). Chapter 5 is the final chapter of the thesis. It consists of analysis of the relevant legal 
material within the theoretical framework presented.  
 12 
2 The system of investment treaty arbitration and its rapid rise 
The number of international treaties has grown significantly the last decades. They have 
been accompanied by a multitude of dispute settlement mechanisms.
20
 The scope of the 
“matters in which each State is permitted … to decide freely”21 has waned accordingly. 
Put otherwise, sovereignty as the content of the state‟s sole discretion reduces as 
international law expands.
22
 
 
Following the decline of socialism as the central ruling policy and ideological adversary 
to capitalism,
23
 the growth of multinational enterprises
24
 and the liberalization of 
international financial markets,
25
 the late 1980s and -90s saw a rapid proliferation of 
treaties concerning international trade and investment. In the field of international 
investment treaty arbitration, a sub-branch of international law,
26
 BITs have been 
promoted, traditionally by developed market economy countries since the 1960s. The 
chief purpose of these treaties is to lay down guarantees for the protection, promotion and 
facilitation of foreign direct investment (FDI)
27
 of persons (juristic and natural). The 
                                                 
 
20
 Chester Brown: A Common Law of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2007) 23. 
21
 Cases Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. Usa) 
(Merits), 1986 ICJ Reports, 14, 108. 
22
Israel de Jesus Butler: Unravelling Sovereignty: Human rights actors and the structure of international 
law (Intersentia 2007) 3.  
23
 Behrens has observed that a complete reassessment of direct investment and capital imports did not begin 
“until the collapse of the socialist economies in Eastern Europe”. Peter Behrens “Towards the 
Constitutionalization of International Investment Protection” 45 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2007), 153–179, 
155. 
24
 For an explanation of this growth, see Peter T. Muchlinski: Multinational Enterprises & The Law 
(Oxford University Press 2007) 25-33. 
25
 Gus van Harten: Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
38. 
26
 Zachary Douglas: “The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration” 74 British Year Book of 
International Law (2003) 185. 
27
 FDI can been defined as “the process whereby residents of one country (the source country) acquire 
ownership of assets for the purpose of controlling the production, distribution and other activities of a firm 
in another country (the host country)”. Imad A. Moosa: Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and 
Practice (Palgrave 2002) 1. 
 13 
target for inward investment as host states have traditionally been developing countries.
28
 
The home states of the investors have traditionally been developed countries. This 
relationship has changed somewhat in recent years, which have seen a rise in treaties 
between developing countries.
29
 
 
According to UNCTAD‟s most recent report, at the end of 2006 the total number of BITs 
worldwide was 2.573,
30
 a large majority of which has been signed since the 1990s.
31
 
Regional investment treaties have followed suit, with the NAFTA and The European 
Energy Charter Treaty
32
 among the most renowned. An endeavor by The Oganisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to create the more comprehensive 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) fell through in 1998, in part due to public 
protest and issues allegedly relating to national sovereignty and democracy.
33
 
                                                 
 
28
 Giorgio. Sacerdoti, "Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection" 269 
Recueil des Cours (1997) 251-460. 298. It is perhaps fair to point out that “a striking feature of BITs is the 
multiplicity of provisions they contain that are specifically designed to protect foreign investments, and the 
absence of provisions specifically designed to ensure economic growth and development”, see Patrick L. 
Robinson: "Criteria to test the development friendliness of international investment agreements" 7 
Transational Corporations (1998) 83-90. 84. 
29
 Andrew T. Guzman and Alan O Sykes: Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Edvard 
Elgar 2007) 215. 
30
 UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2007 (Geneva 2007) 17. According to the 2006 report: ”The trend 
for previous years of expansion and increasing sophistication in international investment rule-making at the 
bilateral, regional and interregional level continued in 2005.” UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2006 
(Geneva 2006) 26. 
31
 An elegant explanation is given by Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, who, utilizing a ”basic competetive 
dynamic model” find that this rise was in good part “propelled by the competition among potential host 
countries for credible property rights protections required by direct investors”. See Zachary Elkins, Andrew 
T. Guzman and Beth Simmons: “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
1960-2000” University of Illinois Law Reiview (2008) 256-304, 266. 
32
 17 December 1994, available at http://www.encharter.org/upload/1/TreatyBook-en.pdf. At the time of 
writing only four cases are decided under this treaty. However, the treaty is likely to become more 
important as investors and lawyers increasingly gain awareness of its potential influence. 
33
 Wälde & Kolo (2001) 811. An insider‟s account of both the proposal and the drafting process is provided 
by Rainer Geiger: ”Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Lessons from the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment” 11 New York University Environmental Law Journal (2002-2003) 95-109. 
Andrew Newcombe, "The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation" 20(1) ICSID Review-FILJ (2005) 1, 
notes that public protest arose because of various so called indirect expropriations cases, most of which will 
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Such negative public opinion – typically voiced by NGOs – has also faced BITs and the 
NAFTA. This has occurred in particular following awards where state regulations issued 
on the grounds of environmental concerns, labor rights and public health where found to 
be in breach of the treaty obligations of the state, but at the moment there seems to be a 
generally unfavorable opinion against investment treaties.
34
 Notably, claims issued by 
Canadian investors against the United States under NAFTA resulted in much debate in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
be discussed infra. Van Harten (2007) 23, comments that it is “puzzling” that developing countries have 
consented to a system of investment treaty arbitration which is largely “as rigorous and intrusive as the 
proposed MAI.” Andrew T. Guzman has given an explanation to this “puzzle” in the form of a prisoner‟s 
dilemma, showing that when countries consider signing investment treaties individually rather than as a 
group, their interest change. Andrew. T. Guzman: "Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining 
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties" 37 Virginia Journal of International Law (1998) 639-688;  
666. 
34
 See e.g. Public Citizen: “NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state cases: Bankrupting Democracy”, September 
2001, available at: http://www.citizen.org/documents; Public Citizen: “NAFTA‟s Threat to Sovereignty and 
Democracy: The Record of NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Cases 1994-2005”, February 2005, available 
at http://www.citizen.org/documents; the documentary “Trading Democracy”, available at 
http://www.pbs.org (Transcript available at: http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_tdfull.html); 
Anthony DePalma: “Nafta's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, 
Critics Say”, New York Times 11 March 2001; Stuart G. Gross: “Inordinate Chill: BITs, Non-NAFTA 
MITs and Host-State Regulatory Freedom – An Indonesian Case Study” 24 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (2003) 893-960; “Tror u-land vil tape”, Klassekampen 13 March 2008 and “RE: Refusal 
to respect Bolivia‟s withdrawal from investment dispute court”, letter to the President of the World Bank of 
15 January 2008, written by representatives of 863 civil society organizations in 59 countries. I assume that 
the extent of this “negative public opinion” is fairly represented by this letter. However, according to 
Behrens (2007) 178: “popular fears that host states who have tied their hands by investment protection 
treaties might be limited to promote, e.g., environmental protection only at the cost of compensating 
foreign investors, are entirely unjustified.” (Italics are mine). An empirical study has shown that the 
influence of FDI on environmental regulation varies with the corruptibility of the host government. High 
levels of corruptibility are associated with weak environmental regulation and vice versa, see M.A. Cole, 
J.R Elliot and P.G. Fredriksson: ”Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI Influence Environmental 
Regulations?” University of Nottingham (Research Paper 2004/20). There is of yet little empirical evidence 
that BITs in reality threatens the regulatory powers of capital exporting states, i.e very few claims have 
been directed against such states thus far. Van Harten (2007) 32-34, 40. However, as mutual consent to 
direct investment treaty arbitration is given generally (cf. de Figueiredo (2008) and Tietje et al (2008) infra 
note 93), i.e. ex ante to the establishment of foreign investors, capital exporting countries should not fail to 
consider this prospect. 
 15 
the U.S. Congress concerning a possible threat to democracy and regulatory ability 
provided by the investment treaties the U.S. have signed.
35
 
 
I will examine the implications and responses of such views below. Suffice here to say 
that state parties and tribunals can take several approaches to counter them, including 
measures of treaty design and treaty application, concerning both procedural and 
substantial rules of international investment law. 
 
2.1 Investment Treaty Arbitration as a system for dispute settlement 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) deals only with legal disputes between sovereign 
states. Disputes arising between a sovereign state on the one hand and a non-state entity 
on the other, must be dealt with through diplomatic protection, which is possible only 
after all domestic remedies are exhausted,
36
 or in other fora of dispute settlement outside 
the classic realm of international law.
37
 
                                                 
 
35
 Van Harten (2007) 40. NAFTA is also an issue in the ongoing U.S. presidential election (although related 
more to trade than investment). Senator Obama (Democratic), for example, has said the U.S. ”should use 
the hammer of a potential opt-out” to force Canada and Mexico to renegotiate the agreement. “Candidates 
Rebuked for attacks on Nafta”, Financial Times 28 February 2008 5. 
36
 Article 1 of the International Law Commission‟s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection provides that: 
 
“Diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement by a 
state adopting in its own right the cause of its national in respect of an injury to that national arising from 
an inter nationally wrongful act of another state.” 
 
Put otherwise, the state intervenes on behalf of its national. This system, with regards to juristic persons, 
i.e. multinational enterprises, is a “remedy so replete with pitfalls that it is unlikely to be of much practical 
use” for settling disputes between an investor and a host state, Muchlinski (2007) 705. The ICJ more or less 
acknowledged this in a recent decision, when it stated that it was "bound to note that, in contemporary 
international law, the protection of the rights of companies and the rights of their shareholders, and the 
settlement of the associated disputes, are essentially governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements for the 
protection of foreign investments, such as the treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign 
investments and the [ICSID Convention] and also by contracts between States and foreign investors. In that 
context, the role of diplomatic protection somewhat faded, as in practice recourse is only made to it in rare 
cases where treaty régimes do not exist or have proved inoperative.” Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio 
 
 
 16 
 
The route of diplomatic protection by a state on behalf of its national can also be replete 
with political inconveniences. The magnitude of this political inconvenience can be such 
that it trumps the interest of the sending state in seeing the alleged wrong against its 
national addressed before an international court. Resolving these disputes within an ex 
ante concluded investment treaty between two sovereign states, largely relieves the 
sending state of what political inconveniences might have been the consequence of 
following the route of diplomatic protection on behalf of its national.  
 
There is of course “a considerable variety of means, mechanisms and institutions 
established to resolve disputes in the field of international law.”38 For example, the 
settlement of disputes arising out of actions or inactions by host states toward investment 
owned by transnational investors can be undertaken in the courts of the host state. 
However, as the host state is party to the dispute, and as these disputes often involve large 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Diallo (Guinea v Congo) (Preliminary Objections) (ICJ General List No 103, 24 May 2007), para. 88. The 
rigidity in this regard of the realm of classic international law does indeed seem to be „classic‟ in every 
meaning of the word: See letter of sometime between 1349-1334 b.c.e in Akkadian from King 
Burnaburiyash II of Babylonia to King Amenophis IV/Akhenaten (Naphu‟rureya) of Egypt, where the 
former sought redress for alleged wrongs commited against Babylonian citizens within the land of Canaan. 
Although the alleged wrongdoings occurred in Canaan, rather than in Egypt, King Ameneophis IV was “the 
duly authorized authority” since the kings of Canaan were his vassals and Ameneophis their overlord. 
Legally Burnaburiyash must hold the king of Egypt responsible, because, then just as now, [a]t the level of 
international diplomacy, the parties involved must be of the equivalent political status.”. Pamela Barmash: 
Homicide in the Biblical World (Cambridge University Press 2005) 178-182; see further David J. 
Bederman: International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge University Press 2001) 88-136. A more recent 
example of the relative inadequacy of diplomatic protection under international law is the ELSI case before 
the ICJ, which was concluded 21 years after the events giving rise to it, see Case Concerning Electronica 
Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15. See generally for example Shaw (2003) 
721-737. On the differences between the investment treaty regime and diplomatic protection, see Douglas 
(2003) 167-180. 
37
 Muchlinski (2007) 704. See for example arbitration awards arising out of alleged breach of contracts 
between the state and investor where international law or ”general principles of law” were chosen as the 
applicable rules between the parties such as TOPCO/Libya (concession agreement). For a discussion of 
those cases, see Oscar Schachter: ”International Law in Theory and Practice” 150 Recueil des Cours (1985) 
301-309 and Alvik (2006) 71-78. 
38
 Shaw (2003) 951. 
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sums and issues of high domestic political importance, the independence of the judiciary 
from political power cannot be taken for granted.
39
  
 
This problem is largely resolved in investment treaties, as the raise in the number of such 
agreements of the last two decades,
40
 has been accompanied by incorporating references 
to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
41
 or other 
means of dispute settlement in most investment treaties. ICSID is a forum under the 
auspices of the World Bank that allows for direct arbitration between a contracting state 
and a national of another contracting state –the so-called ”delocalized” character of 
ICSID.
42
 With respect to classic international law, BITs ”innovate substantially” in this 
manner,
43
 referred by a seasoned commentator as an ontological condition for the regime 
itself: “Investment treaties fall and stand with their recourse to international 
arbitration.”44 For facilitating the swift and proper settlement of such disputes, the Center 
functions as an arbitral institution and the ICSID convention provides procedural rules.
45
 
As of May 2008 there were over 120 cases pending.
46
 
                                                 
 
39
 Sacerdoti (1997) 414. There are also other advantages with investment treaty arbitration, such as 
swiftness and expertise.  
40
 William W. Burke-White: ”The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the 
Legitimacy of the ICSID System”, Transnational Dispute Management (Provisional issue, January 2008) 
41
 ICSID was established by The Washington Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States 1965(Hereinafter ”ICISD Convention”) 575, U.N.T.S. 159, in force 16 
October 1966). I will not go into details of the ICSID Convention, but see generally for example Aron 
Broches: "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes" 136 Recueil des Cours 331 (1972 II), 
Andreas Lowenfeld: International Economic Law (Oxford University Presss 2003) 456-460, Muchlinski 
(2007) 703-745. Most BITs refer only to ICSID arbitration as a way of settling disputes, cf. Muchlinski 
(2007), 703. It emerged as the leading investment treaty arbitration forum in the 1990s, Van Harten (2007) 
27. According to Article 27 of the ICSID Convention, no party shall give diplomatic protection to a 
national regarding a dispute submitted for arbitration under the convention when the national and another 
state party have consentened to ICSID Arbitration. Non-compliance by the other state party (cf. Article 53) 
leads to a revival of the right to diplomatic protection. 
42
 See the ICSID Convention Articles 26 and 27, which (with certain limitations) excludes other national 
and international remedies respectively; and Muchlinski (2007) 718, 734-740. 
43
 Sacerdoti (1997) 437. 
44
 Thomas Wälde: ”The ‟Umbrella‟ Clause in Investment Arbitration – A Comment on Original Intentions 
and Recent Cases” 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2005) 183-236, 190. 
45
 The international procedural rules providing admissibility (such as the customary international law rule 
of the necessity of exhausting remedies) does not apply unless otherwise stipulated by treaty between the 
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A similar approach to that of dispute settlement under BITs can be found e.g. in Chapter 
11 of the NAFTA treaty,
47
 which provides for arbitration under ICSID or commercial 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules for disputes between investors and one of the 
contracting states,
48
 as well as in the European Energy Charter Treaty.
49
 
 
It has been argued that the rights and obligations of investment treaties are applicable in 
”two distinct spheres”.50 On the one hand, in one ”sphere” there is the legal position of 
the state parties to the treaty vis á vis each other.
51
 On the other, in a second ”sphere”, 
there is the legal position of the investors of the contracting home state towards the host 
state.
52
 If an arbitral tribunal holds that actions or inactions attributable to the host state 
which affects the investment located in that state, owned by a national of the contracting 
home state are in breach of the treaty, this does not affect the legal relationship between 
the state parties.
53
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
parties, see Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7. (Argentina/Spain BIT), Award on Jurisdiction, 
25 January 2000 para. 22 (on the interpretation of Article 26 of the ICSID Convention) and Douglas (2003) 
240-241. 
46
 www.worldbank.org/ICSID 
47
 There are some differences. For example, according to Article 1116 the investor must have suffered a 
loss or damage by reason of the breach of the treaty. 
48
 The latter rules are used when none of the disputing parties are party to the agreement or national of a 
contracting state. As neither Canada nor Mexico is party to the ICSID Convention, this is not impractical. 
49
 Disputes under this treaty can also be settled by the rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, cf. 
Article 26 of the treaty. The MERCOSUR and the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments also use ICSID arbitration, but I will not go into these agreements here. 
50
 Douglas (2003) 189. 
51
 See for instance Article 1136(5) of NAFTA. 
52
 Douglas (2003) 189. 
53
 Douglas (2003) 191, 222-223. This means the inter-state rules of international responsibility does not 
apply. A legal consequence would be that exhaustion of remedies by the investor, a rule of customary 
international law I mentioned above with regard to diplomatic protection, need not be fulfilled even if the 
applicable investment treaty is silent on the matter, see Douglas (2003) 192-193. This should not be 
understood as the rules of customary international law not being applicable in general when the treaty is 
silent. They certainly are, see e.g. Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic 
(Dutch/Czech BIT), Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 254, where the Tribunal found that the word 
”deprivation” in Article 5 of the applicable BIT was a reference which imported into the treaty the ”notion 
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BITs sometimes contain the formula ”in accordance with host State law” in defining the 
term ”investment”. This does not mean that the extent of protection offered by the BIT is 
determined solely by the domestic law of the host state. Such provisions refer, as held by 
the Tribunal in Salini v. Morocco “to the validity of the investment and not to its 
definition. More specifically, it seeks to prevent the Bilateral Treaty from protecting 
investments that should not be protected because they would be illegal”.54 
 
The object of protection remains determined, in principle, by international customary law 
or applicable treaties. At the same time, the existence of an investment will often be 
conditioned by the validity of legal acts, such as concessions and shareholder rights, 
under the law of the host state, when a contract is valid, how and by whom it can be 
annulled and so forth.
55
  
 
It follows from the analysis above that the nature of investment arbitration constitutes a 
genuine hybrid between private law and public international law, which is why some has 
called it a “manifestation of global administrative law.”56 Municipal law is therefore an 
indispensable part of the applicable rules of the system. This might be one of the reasons 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
that a deprivation can be justified if it results from the exercise of regulatory actions aimed at the 
maintenance of public order.” 
54
 Salini Construtorri S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (23 
July 2001). (Italy/Morocco BIT) para. 46. See also Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18 
(Lithuania/Ukraine BIT) Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004. paras 83 et seq; Bayindir Insaat Turizm 
Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29 (Turkey/Pakistan BIT). 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, paras 105-110 and Saluka investments v. Czech Republic, 
(note 53 above) paras 203, 204, 217, and Jurisdiction: municipal law is applicable to the investment 
contract, whereas international law is applicable to assessing the conduct paras 96, 101. 
55
 Schreuer and Kriebaum 746. 
56
 Gus van Harten and Martin Loughlin: ”Investment Treaty Arbitration as a species of Global 
Administrative Law” 17 European Journal of International Law (2006) 121- 150, 127. Mattias Kumm‟s 
concept of ”international law as governance” may also be illuminating. Mattias Kumm: “The Legitimacy of 
International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework for Analysis” 15 The European Journal of International 
Law (2004) 907-931, 915. 
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why treaty tribunals let part of the decisions in many awards remain anchored in the host 
state‟s executive powers, granting a margin of appreciation. 
 
This argument necessitates a qualification. The claim I make may not seem entirely 
convincing in the sense that what is at issue here is not that domestic courts in the host 
state may be the body best fit to apply the municipal law of the host state (rather than an 
arbitral tribunal usually composed of experts of international investment law, not 
necessarily with any particular knowledge of the municipal law of the host state), because 
if the claim is admissible before an investment tribunal, it is often simultaneously 
inadmissible before domestic courts. The result is that the body granted discretion will be 
the very executive organ, the effect of whose action or inaction incited the investor to 
claim that his rights under an investment treaty was breached. In this sense the discretion 
bears more resemblance to classic administrative discretion than the margin of 
appreciation of the ECtHR. 
 
2.2 Sovereignty and investment law 
As economist Hernando de Soto confidently has noted, “[f]oreign investment is, of 
course, a very good thing. The more of it, the better.”57 The political or economical aim 
of investment treaties is, at the outset, to attract FDI, mainly from developed countries to 
developing countries.
58
 It must be borne in mind however, that all such treaties are 
                                                 
 
57
 Hernando de Soto: The Mystery of Capital (Basic Books 2001) 3. 
58
 But it has been contested to what avail, see  Kenneth Vandevelde: "The Economics of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties" 41 Harvard International Law Journal (2000) 469-502; Jeswald Salacuse and 
Nicholas P. Sullivan: "Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Grand Bargain" 46 Harvard International Law Journal (2005) 67-130; Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess: 
"Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign investment to developing countries?" (2005) Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=616242, Mary Hallward-Driemeier: "Do Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit...and They Could Bite" World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3121 (World Bank 2003); Andrew. T. Guzman: "Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt 
Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties" 37 Virginia Journal of International 
Law (1998) 639-688; Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman, and Beth Simmons: “Competing for Capital: The 
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reciprocal, protecting nationals from both contracting states in the other state. To some 
extent, an overlooked element by developed countries insisting on direct arbitration 
between a foreign investor and the host state, is the setting aside of their own prerogative 
in the passing judgment, a fundamental aspect of the sovereign state.
59 
 
There is in my view reason to contest the notion of investment treaties as a threat to 
national sovereignty.
60
 Although it can be argued that investment treaties in one way 
challenge the state‟s sovereignty, all its state powers are (formally) left intact. 
Furthermore, treaties result in contractually and voluntarily compromising sovereignty in 
order to achieve a more important aim.
61
 Consent to international investment treaties, like 
that to any treaty, can be withdrawn, although the state seldom does so for fear of 
political repercussions.
62
 In this paragraph, then, we even see two analytically differing 
concepts of sovereignty. The internal: the authority within the state; and the external: the 
capacity to enter treaties.
63
 The margin of appreciation only relates to the former. 
 
Even so, increasingly, one should acknowledge that there is an overlap between the 
questions that has traditionally been regarded as entirely or primarily within the domestic 
sphere, and those within the sphere of international law. This has been accompanied, not 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, University of Illionois Law Review (2008) 265 and Christoph 
Engels: “Governments in Dilemma: A Game Theoretic Model for the Conclusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties - A Comment on Competing for Capital”, University of Illionois Law Review (2008) 305. and 
Guzman & Sykes (2007). Overall, it seems plausible to conclude that BITs have a positive, but limited 
impact on FDI.  
59
Sacerdoti (1997) 299.  
60
 Similar arguments have been made in the context of almost all international courts and tribunals. A 
thorough discussion would exceed the space available, but see e.g. the literature referred to by Brown: 
(2007) 18 (n. 10). 
61
 Stephen D. Kramer: “Compromising Westphalia”, 20 International Security (1995-96) 115-51, 117. 
62
 Put otherwise, the cost of non-participation is thought to be higher than voluntarily curtailing part of the 
state‟s power. In any case I willingly concede to the point made by MacCormick: “Let us think of 
[sovereignty] rather more as of virginity, which can in at least some circumstances be lost to the general 
satisfaction without anybody else gaining it”. Neil MacCormick: “Beyond the Sovereign State”, 56 Modern 
Law Review (1993) 1, 16. 
63
 Krasner (1995-96) 119.  
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only by treaties, but also by third-party dispute settlement mechanisms, such as arbitral 
tribunals in the field of investment treaty arbitration. For the states bound by it, this, 
arguably, results in less “flexibility in the interpretation and enforcement of international 
law.”64 For this reasons, when introducing tribunals that through independent 
adjudicative processes limit the state‟s ability to act within its own borders it is therefore 
perhaps more appropriate to utilize the term “loss of control”, albeit this phrase is 
stripped of the grandeur of 1648-and-all-that speak so common to the lawyers, diplomats 
and statesmen of international aspirations that have shaped the field, not to speak of the 
political connotations.
65
 Sovereignty, then, is what states make of it.  
 
As we shall see, this has implications for my understanding of the rationale of the margin 
of appreciation and is one of the reasons behind the legitimacy perspective I put forward 
in this thesis. For state parties it is often less a matter of if a treaty is a “threat” to national 
sovereignty, but rather how it is perceived, particularly among key-constituents. 
 
Recent arbitral awards, mainly dealing with the question of expropriation or measures 
tantamount to expropriation, have contributed in making the question of an emerging 
margin of appreciation in international investment one of considerable present interest.
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 Kumm (2004) 914.  
65
 Sovereignty and control are intertwined. The term "control" in international law has a jurisdictional 
function: Where a state exercises control outside of its own borders, its jurisdictional powers as a state can 
be extended accordingly, and, consequently, liability can be incurred. Michael Akehurst: “Jurisdiction in 
International Law” 46 British Year Book of International Law (1972-73) 146. See the argument in Drozd 
and Janousek vs. France and Spain (Application No. 12747/87) judgment of 26 June 1992, SERIES A, No. 
240, para. 91. In the same way, arbitrational tribunals have, by its consent, usurped one area of control 
within the state, namely that of jurisdictional power over certain disputes regarding certain alien investors. 
Thus, sovereignty, in the form of State consent to a treaty, must remain unchallenged (thus instilling a 
„legitimacy check‟) for the arbitral tribunal to keep its powers whereas the State‟s control certainly is 
challenged, indeed, lessened. Jackson makes a similar argument in connection with the WTO. John 
Jackson: “The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the 
Uruguay Round Results” 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1998) 157-188, 161. This is not to 
deny the observation of Douglas (2003) 214, that arbitration under international investment law is different 
from “situations where the municipal legal system voluntarily … curtails its adjudicative or supervisory 
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 In particular, cases under the NAFTA surprised both governments and outside observers 
when the first claims filed under its Chapter 11 – which provides investors a right to 
direct legal recourse against potential discriminatory treatment and uncompensated 
expropriations of investments by the state parties – involved sensitive environmental 
matters such as the issue of the siting of a hazardous waste facility.
66
 In these cases, the 
result was that the regulatory competence of the state in environmental issues – or at least 
some aspects of this competence – had shifted from the state to an international tribunal 
through what can be labeled “judicial activism”.67 
 
It is submitted that this legal development corresponds not to only a growing public 
interest in international limits to public policy law making with regards to for example 
environmental and labour issues, fuelled by the processes of globalization, but also of the 
increasing awareness of developed countries that more and more frequently they will find 
themselves in the position as respondent to claims that they have breached the protection 
international legal instruments offer foreign investors. Observations along this line led 
one scholar to ask the question of whether international investment law was at a 
crossroads: 
There are questions as to whether third world countries have given away too much and 
receive too little by way of helpful foreign investment in return. There are questions 
about the degree of substantive protection that should be given foreign investors. 
There are questions about the suitability of procedural mechanisms originally 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
competence over international commercial arbitrations conducted within its jurisdiction.” See also Kumm: 
(2004) 907-31.  
66
 Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1. (NAFTA).Award, 30 August 2000 
(English) 
67
 As opposed to judicial restraint. See Eva Brems: "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law 
of the European Convention of Human Rights" (1996) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recth und 
Völkerrecht 240-314.297 for this terminology in the context of the ECtHR. 
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developed in private commercial contexts for disputes that contain more and more 
elements that implicate the public interest.
68
 
Thus, it can be claimed the legitimacy of the system of international investment 
protection is at stake.
69
 I argue, then, that the margin of appreciation responds to some of 
these concerns through development of less intrusive – and therefore politically more 
tolerable – standards of review of national decisions.70 
 
Originally, the ECtHR developed the margin of appreciation as a “tactical response to the 
„fragile foundations‟ upon which the system was based”.71 It was part of a self-preserving 
strategy of judicial restraint at a time when its role was less secure than that of domestic 
courts.
72
 The margin of appreciation doctrine then had the role of a pragmatic tool for the 
gradual, non-activist realization of the convention‟s goals.73 The aim of this thesis is to 
analyse whether international investment tribunals are taking a similar approach in a 
similar situation for the system of investment treaty arbitration.
74
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 Detlev Vagts: "International Investment Law at a Crossroads" 3 Transnational Dispute Management 
Issue No. 3 (June 2006). Italics are mine. 
69
 Susan Franck: "The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions" 76 Fordham Law Review (2005), 1586–1587. See in particular notes 
327 and 328. See also Olivia Chung: “The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect 
on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration” 47 Virginia Journal of International Law (2007) 953-976. 
70
 Shany (2006). 
71
 R. St. Macdonald: “The Margin of Appreciation”, in R. St. J Macdonald et al (eds.): The European 
System for Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 83-124, 123 and James. A. Sweeney, "A 
'Margin of Appreciation' in the Internal Market: Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights" 34 
Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2007) 27-52, 42. 
72
 Arai-Takahashi (2002) 232. 
73
 Brems (1996) 297. James Sweeney: “Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European 
Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era” 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2005) 459-474, 467. 
74
 By ”similar” I do not claim that the system of investment treaty arbitration is based upon ”fragile 
foundations”. Still, I claim that these are times when the (percieved) legitmacy of the system is at best 
fragile. In discussing denunciation from the ICSID Convention, Tietje et al (2008) 27 points out that 
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Preserving the very system of European human rights protection is not, however, the 
main role of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
today.
75
 Rather, it has evolved into a quite sophisticated technique for identifying the 
boundaries of state interference with the rights provided individuals by the ECHR. I 
believe there is substance in the claim that investment treaty tribunals increasingly are 
following the path of the ECtHR in this respect.
76
 It is the interplay between these two 
aspects of the margin of appreciation doctrine, then, – its original and its current rationale 
– that best explains its current use in investment treaty arbitration. 
 
I seek to identify the line between such regulating steps the host State as such takes 
against a foreign investor that under the relevant BIT will be considered legitimate and 
those that will not. It is submitted a certain degree of discretion is left to the State to 
undertake such measures it deems necessary to achieve a certain aim. A balance must be 
struck between the competing interests of foreign investors and states, so that, on the one 
hand the latter can not abuse their sovereign powers to discriminate unfairly towards an 
alien. On the other hand, an investment treaty must not impose on the parties 
unreasonable burdens and obligations which could not be foreseen as the treaty was 
signed and which have an effect of making necessary public regulation impossible or 
excessively difficult.  
 
In any case, it seems plausible to argue that as soon as it has consented to an investment 
treaty, the State concerned is not the sole judge of whether the necessary legal conditions 
of a regulating step is met.
77
 But neither are international arbitral tribunals, with treaty-
                                                                                                                                                 
 
interpretations too much in favour of either the state or the investor “would be clearly detrimental to the 
overall stability of the fragile international framework of investment law”. 
75
 Sweeney (2005) 467. 
76
 See cases below. 
77
 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 
1997, para. 70. 
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vested competence, necessarily left with the legal powers to review all aspects of the 
legality of any measure. Who is, for example, to decide if a regulating measure chosen by 
the State, given that several similar reasonable options were available and appeared as 
such, was the correct one? The case law of different international arbitral tribunals will be 
analysed to determine whether such a claim reasonably can be supported. 
 
The regulating steps or measures a host State might seek to undertake while exercising its 
police powers will be analyzed in the perspective of the margin of appreciation. For 
example, a host state‟s decision to refuse a foreign investor the full utilization of his 
investment must be tested against the prohibition against expropriation that does not 
complete the criteria of legal expropriation according to the treaties and customary 
international law.
78
 
 
To little extent I aim to describe how I think international investment tribunals should 
have decided in particular cases. Rather, I seek to analyze descriptively what choice was 
taken by the tribunals in previously given awards with respect to the margin of 
appreciation. Still, one is seldom left without any normative ideas after studying a topic 
for more than a year, and neither am I. What beliefs I have acquired de sententia ferenda 
within the confines of my chosen topic and theoretical framework are, however, 
superseded by thoughts on the oughts of the treaties on which such decisions by arbitral 
tribunals are based. In short, I believe it is more important to adjust the outcome of the 
norm creating behavior of states than that of the norm applying behavior of tribunals. 
                                                 
 
78
 In short it most be undertaken for a public purpose, be non-discriminatory, comply with applicable 
procedures of law and finally compensation must be paid to the foreign investor. See e.g. World Bank 
Guidelines for the Treatment of Foreign Investors Section IV Art. 1; Yves L. Fortier and Stephen L. 
Drymer: "Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I know it when I see it, or Caveat 
Investor" (2004) ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal pp. 295-296. Expropriation under 
international law will be dealt with more extensively in Chapter 4 below. 
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3 Investment treaty arbitration and legitimacy 
Legitimacy is vital to any effective treaty regime.
79
 Perceived effectivity is necessary for 
providing real effectivity.
80
 To be seen as effective and therefore legitimate, as Thomas 
Franck has observed, the system‟s “decisions must be arrived at discursively in 
accordance with what is accepted by the parties as the right process.”81 Right process, 
then, is determined inter alia by “certain consequential values”.82 If a treaty regime, such 
as investment treaties, systematically provide consequences contrary to these 
expectations, for example if general environmental concerns are systematically trumped 
by the interests of foreign investors in the decisions of aribtral tribunals,
83
 or even if there 
is a perception that this is the case, the long term consequence can prove harmful to the 
legitimacy of the treaty regime. In this vein, to be seen as effective, the system must be 
seen as legitimate, or, put otherwise, the system‟s legitimacy is requisite for ensuring the 
actors‟ compliance with it and even preventing denunciation.84 
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 The study of legitimacy in international law and politics has garnered considerable interest the last 
decade. See e.g the overview provided by Ian Clark: International Legitimacy and World Society (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 16. Kumm has found the lack of interest in such questions “puzzling”. Kumm 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 And even, to a certain extent, vice versa. 
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 But see Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter: ”International Law, International Relations and 
Compliance” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.): Handbook of International 
Relations (Sage Publisher 2002) 538-558, 539.  
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By “legitimacy”, I mean here a concept relating to the “justification and acceptance”85 of 
the authority exercised by arbitral tribunals by virtue of international investment treaty 
between states, rather than a theoretical explanation or questioning of international law or 
any sub-branch thereof.
86
 More specifically, I am interested in the perceived legitimacy 
of the outcome of the authority exercised by arbitral tribunals. This perception might, of 
course, be a contributing factor to the legitimacy of the system of investment treaty 
arbitration. This legitimacy, in some degree, is one of the conditions, I believe, for 
compliance with and consent to, and hence the existence of the system in toto.
87
 The 
function of legitimacy as a pull-factor for compliance and consent is, however, difficult 
to prove empirically.
88
 I confess, therefore, that I find it difficult to subscribe solely to the 
view of general international law through a “normative optic”,89 that is, the view that 
these norms are obeyed because of their status as such. However, as regards international 
investment law, it seems reasonable to assume that the level of compliance is relatively 
high.
90
 This is because the system of dispute resolution is effective and because the 
awards typically concern individual investors and measures affecting them only.
91
 Yet, 
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this does not imply that the legitimacy of the system, as of all legal norms and 
institutions, is not vital. 
 
Structurally, the concept of legitimacy in international investment law can be seen as a 
condition that exists on three different, yet inter-related, co-dependant levels. The first is 
the governmental level; the second is the civil society level, composed of NGOs and 
individuals,
92
 the third is the investors, usually multinational enterprises. Each of these 
levels represents diverging interests, values and approaches. 
 
The connection in this respect between these three levels is the following: Because 
“power in modern states is recognized as being distributed along formal and informal 
networks,” sufficiently strong resentment against international norms and institutions on 
one level, e.g. civil society level, cannot remain unaddressed to sufficiently large extent 
for a long time, lest the legitimacy, and hence the state‟s willingness to present behavior 
compliant with the regime, or even its willingness to maintain its consent to it, risk being 
compromised.
93
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Consent to international commitments – and the legitimacy of international norms and 
institutions – must be elicited not only “through internal procedures, formal and 
informal”,94 but also by inducing norm legitimacy through external activity. This refers to 
various kinds of adjudicative behavior and describes a process composed of norm-
applying and norm-interpretation.
95
  
 
The margin of appreciation as a standard of review is in my opinion best viewed as an 
interpretative technique. When applied appropriately, the technique possesses the quality 
of strengthening the legitimacy of the outcome of adjudicative behavior, e.g. investment 
treaty awards.
96
 However, if applied too extensively, there is a risk that it can be 
counterproductive in this respect, in the same vein as has been argued of its usage in the 
ECtHR.
97
 
 
As will be shown below the subjective bona fide intentions of the state allegedly in 
breach of an international norm will sometimes, but not always, matter a great deal for 
the adjudicator vested with the competence to decide whether the regulatory powers of 
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the state is taken advantage of in a manner incompatible with the international norm. It is 
submitted that where this path is chosen by investment arbitrators – where applicable – it 
will increase the long term legitimacy of the system of investment treaty arbitration. 
3.1 The legitimacy of the law of international foreign investment 
Legitimacy is not an absolute standard; it is a matter of degree.
98
 Norm legitimacy, 
furthermore enhance the prospects for compliance by invoking characteristics “broadly 
related to „fairness‟.”99 In their classic work on compliance with international norms, 
Chayes and Chayes observed that in “the international system, the norms are interpreted, 
elaborated, shaped, reformulated, and applied in large part in the course of debate about 
the justification for contested action. The discourse is not confined to the meaning of the 
norm, but extends to acceptable grounds or excuse for non-performance, in accordance 
with the principle that treaties are “to be performed in good faith.”100 It is the grounds 
for non-performance – or, more precisely, the prima facie contestation of whether there is 
a non-performance at all – that is at issue when the margin of appreciation is invoked by 
a state party. This internal, legal process relates to the external, factual behavior of states, 
and not only to their compliance with investment treaties, but also whether investment 
treaties are in their interest. 
 
3.1.1 Enhancing legitimacy by treaty design: three approaches 
 
This is not a thesis on treaty negotiation; yet, it is submitted that if governments feel there 
is too little leeway for regulation under investment treaties, and if this concern is of such 
magnitude that it compromises the willingness to adhere to or sign such agreements, 
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consent should be given only to agreements that take this concern into account.
101
 
Thereby focus will be shifting to the ex ante process of granting constitutive powers to 
tribunals in a manner consistent with this concern, for example by explicitly granting 
tribunals the competence to take the state‟s intent into account and grant a degree of 
deference to national authorities such as in Article 17.6 of the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement and the national emergency clauses of human rights conventions, or the 
approach taken in Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR.
102
 In this vein, 
tribunals should not be expected to venture outside of their allocated domain of 
interpretation. One practical qualification that should be added is the commonsensical 
objection that the interests of (mainly) capital-exporting and (mainly) capital-importing 
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countries in this manner can be assumed to be incongruent, sometimes to the extent of 
incompatibility.
103
 This incurs high costs on the drafting parties.  
 
A second approach (ex post) is to reinterprate the substantive obligations of the treaty that 
the tribunal oversees. This approach usually necessitates consensus among the parties. In 
2001 the three NAFTA parties, acting as the NAFTA Free Trade Commission under 
NAFTA Article 2001, chose this approach. The Commission issued a statement “to 
clarify and reaffirm the meaning of” a provision of NAFTA Chapter 11. The Commission 
acted after an investor-state dispute settlement panel had expansively interpreted that 
phrase.
104
 In a subsequent award, the Tribunal considered itself bound to follow the 
Commission‟s statement.105 
 
A third approach is to include reservations that take the issue into account. This is not 
impractical. On November 23, 2007, the Ecuadorian government notified ICSID that it 
would not accept its jurisdiction in cases stemming from disputes over nonrenewable 
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resources.
106
 In this way, states can exclude arbitral tribunals from having jurisdiction 
over sensitive areas or resources, such as energy or water services. 
3.1.2 Enhancing legitimacy through treaty interpretation – the external 
perspective 
 
In May 2007 Bolivia, as the first country ever, withdrew from the ICSID Convention.
107
 
Venezuela has declared it will follow suit. 30 April 2008 it gave the Netherlands formal 
notice that it would terminate the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT.
108
 There were probably 
several reasons for this action, including popular resentment and a domestic political 
situation in many countries in which opposition by some Latin American countries 
against the system of investment treaty arbitration similar to the one seen in the 1970s has 
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flourished.
109
 In addition to ICSID, Bolivian President Evo Morales was quoted by The 
Washington Post as denouncing “legal, media and diplomatic pressure of some 
multinationals that … resist the sovereign rulings of countries, making treats and 
initiating suits in international arbitration.”110 
 
I believe the perceived lack of legitimacy of the system was also a reason for 
withdrawal.
111
 The cause of these events is in my view not primarily an issue of 
insufficient compliance behavior with either the ICSID Convention or the international 
investment treaties.
112
 Rather, it is the slightly different question of denunciation from 
such treaties. Even so, I believe compliance theory offers a valid and instructive remedy 
in pointing towards the alleged legitimacy deficit. To avoid further withdrawals, then, the 
actors within the system should be aware of this alleged deficit, and, to the extent that it 
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does not fundamentally compromise the interests of any remaining actors,
113
 it should be 
countered. 
 
Legitimacy both derives from state consent, and is an essential pre-condition if 
governments are to be convinced to give their consent to regulatory regimes. Accordingly 
where law is made and applied through a long-established process that gives effect to 
state consent there is less likelihood of its being deemed illegitimate, while the legitimacy 
of new or adapted law-making processes may be challenged, especially where in one way 
or another they by-pass expressly given state consent.
114
 As Professor Jackson observed 
in the 1990s, a similar question of law making and appliance through interpretation – the 
standard of review – in the GATT/WTO rule system became “something of a touchstone 
regarding the relationship of „sovereignty‟ concepts”.115 
 
I should add one caveat: Whereas I claim that if investment tribunals grant states a 
margin of appreciation, this contributes to heightened perceived legitimacy of the system 
of investment treaty arbitration – which, in turn, can be assumed to strengthen the level of 
compliance observed by states – I do not believe legitimacy is in itself sufficient for 
ensuring state compliance with international legal norms in all situations.
116
 The question 
asked in this thesis, then, is not why states adhere to the rules of international investment 
treaty or fail to do so. The question I ask is the rather less sophisticated (the negative of 
the former) of why don‟t they just leave. What prevents states from opting out of harmful 
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treaties? The answer – although a truism – might be that states believe it to be in their 
interest not to.
117
 
 
This belief can perhaps be strengthened through legal techniques that contribute to the 
legitimacy of the regime. For adjudicators and treaty-makers this means that all the 
addressees, in a broad sense, of the regulation must be included. This is because a central 
determinant of rule-legitimacy is the “extent to which the rule-related decision making is 
considered to be fair. A procedure is likely to be considered fair by the addressees of a 
regulation provided that they have an opportunity to participate in the rule-related 
decision making and it does not systematically favor certain interests over other.”118 One 
particularly salient feature of the system of investment treaty arbitration is that this 
legitimacy must be strengthened through mechanisms that takes into account not only the 
interests of the state parties to the treaty and their various sub-branches in government, 
but also the potential claimants, i.e. foreign investors.
119
 If the foreign investors do not 
perceive the system to be legitimate, they are not likely to trust it. This might result in 
declining efficiency in the investment treaty regime in terms of obtaining the desired 
outcome, i.e. a negative effect on the desired contribution to FDI. 
 
How can the interests of the involved parties be accommodated by the arbitral tribunal? 
The most notable example is the outcome of the cases. The outcome of a case is likely to 
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be regarded as legitimate if the decision is made in an even-handed, fair and just 
manner.
120
 In other words, it is the tribunal‟s reasoning that must be considered 
legitimacy-wise. Since international investment agreements only regulate the behavior of 
the state parties, not the behavior of the investors – and since arbitral tribunals 
consequently are charged with the task of reviewing the acts or omissions of a state – it is 
the manner in which arbitral tribunals consider such acts or inactions that can contribute 
to the legitimacy of the decisions they make.  This is where the margin of appreciation 
and the principle of proportionality become relevant in the context of legitimacy. 
 
As I indicated above, one way to enhance legitimacy in this respect is to take the 
intentions of the state into account when reviewing its acts or inactions. For instance, a 
regulatory act by the state with the effect of expropriating the investment of a foreign 
investor covered by an investmen treaty can be reviewed by an arbitral tribunal in 
different ways. Firstly, the tribunal can measure the effect of the regulation on the 
investor only. Secondly, the tribunal can allow for the intent of the regulation to be taken 
into account. It can still impose a review (with various degrees of strictness) on the 
suitability of the regulation to achieve its stated goal. An example of this kind of review 
is whether the regulation by the state was really necessary from an objective point of 
view, e.g. whether there is a sound scientific basis for the ban on the operation of the 
investment on the grounds that it led to seriously adverse environmental consequences.
121
  
 
A final alternative is for the tribunal to take at face-value the claim of the state that its 
regulation was intended only to achieve its stated goal, thus refraining from review of the 
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valid regulations of a sovereign state. As the Tribunal in Saluka investments v. Czech 
Republic noted: “In the absence of clear and compelling evidence that the [Czech 
National Bank] erred or acted otherwise improperly in reaching its decision, which 
evidence has not been presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal must in the circumstances 
accept the justification given by the Czech banking regulator for its decision.”122 This 
does approach does in my view imply a lenient standard of review. Of course, no tribunal 
could say that despite clear and compelling evidence to the contrary, it will accept the 
justification given by the respondent, but a lower requirement could nonetheless have 
been possible. A requirement to produce evidence that is “clear and compelling” to show 
that the authorities “erred or acted otherwise improperly” makes it difficult for an 
investor to convince tribunals of their claim. The following chapter examines such state-
biased standards of review and ways in which they can be acommodated with the 
interests of investors. 
4 The “margin of appreciation” doctrine as a standard of 
review 
4.1 The ECHR and Investment Treaty Arbitration 
 
As indicated earlier, the margin of appreciation has been developed on the international 
level primarily by the ECtHR. The ECHR was the first international human rights 
convention. Following 14 additional protocols, it probably remains the one with the most 
advanced mechanisms for resolving individual and inter-State complaints. The ECtHR is 
the central legal authority of the ECHR. Through its jurisprudence, the court decides the 
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scope of its own supervisory powers, and therefore upon the scope of the discretionary 
powers left to the States Parties “for the definition, interpretation and application of the 
basic human rights guarantees contained in the treaty.”123 This role has resulted in the 
ECtHR becoming the primary developer of the doctrine at the international level. 
 
The Court has been highly successful. Indeed, as Douglas Donoho has commented, the 
ECHR in many ways” represents the only example of a traditional international 
enforcement paradigm that functions effectively, albeit only on a regional level”.124 A 
vast amount of legal decisions is given every year. In 2006 alone it made 1.560 
judgments and 28.300 other decisions.
125
 Taking this into consideration, it does not seem 
particularly rash to conclude that the Court through the case law it has generated has had 
a considerable influence over other international law fields as well. This influence may 
well be one that does not correspond to the limited, regional direct sphere of the Court, 
nor, perhaps, to the relative importance of the field of international human rights.  
 
4.2 Differences in facts and values 
The consequences of this claim, if it is correct, cannot be taken for granted. International 
human rights treaties are often, as Thedor Meron has pointed out, distinguished from 
other fields of international law in terms “of virtual elimination of reciprocity, contraction 
of domestic jurisdiction, and operation of the law not between theoretically equal 
sovereign entities, but between governments – subject to duties – and individuals 
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benefiting from rights, all that mostly within the nation State”.126 Most of these elements 
do not seem to differentiate international human rights law from international investment 
law. Yet other elements, addressed below, seem to do just that. 
 
However that may be, the aim of a prudent and thorough analysis of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine in international law would inevitably display substantial 
deficiencies not giving thought to the advanced development of the doctrine in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Occasionally, and, I argue, increasingly, arbitral tribunals 
display little hesitation drawing conclusions from the case law of human rights courts.
127
 
For instance, in Tecmed v. Mexico, the panel pointed to both decisions from the ECtHR 
and the Interamerican Court of Human Rights.
128
 
 
It is important to note that the circumstances and principles and object and purpose in 
issue in the ECHR, in the context of Articles 2-11, are not ad idem with those in issue 
here, that is, protection of foreign investment.
129
 Focus is given to the particular case law 
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of Article 1 of the first protocol to the ECHR, since this provision bears more 
resemblance to the protection against regulatory takings offered by international 
investment agreements. 
 
There are also differences, however. For example, as noted above, whereas the ECHR 
protects everyone within the jurisdiction of the state, the legal protection of international 
investment treaties is offered foreign nationals only. Moreover, as I have mentioned 
above, a fundamental aspect of international investment treaties is that they provide for 
direct arbitration, rather than necessitating the exhaustion of local remedies.
130
 This 
means that it is often the executive or administrative acts of the states that is being held to 
scrutiny by arbitral tribunals, whereas the ECtHR can also review decisions of local 
courts, and, crucially, it defers some judgments to such institutions. 
 
From the perspective of the underlying values or “the larger societal context against 
which the European human rights protection system and the international supervisory 
function within it are measured”,131 and the corresponding of the system of investment 
treaty arbitration, there are also differences. The ECHR signatories (more or less) share 
“the Judeo-Christian tradition, democracy, and mixed-market economies.”132 For 
example, in Lithgow v. United Kingdom, the Court based its reasoning on among others 
the factor that a “decision to enact nationalisation legislation will commonly involve 
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consideration of various issues on which opinions within a democratic society may 
reasonably differ widely.”133 
 
Can an arbitral tribunal reasonably argue in the same vein? I believe that is not the case, 
absent any specific treaty provision stipulation otherwise, because there are no such 
denominators among signatories to investment protection treaties, which encompass 
almost any kind of variation among nations found in the world today. 
 
4.3 The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights 
The margin of appreciation is used by the ECtHR to indicate the measure of discretion 
given to the state parties, notes Yutaka Arai-Takahasi, “in the manner in which they 
implement the legal standards of the treaty, taking into account their own particular 
national circumstances and conditions,”134 both legal, cultural, social and other. It can be 
seen as a label about the suitable extent of judicial review that take these factors into 
account.
135
 It seems plausible then that widespread usage – and a wide application – of 
the margin of appreciation, challenges the ambitions of a high level of unity in any supra- 
or international legal order. In European human rights law, the margin may be a potential 
opposite to legal universality, even when bearing in mind that universality is not the same 
as uniformity.
136
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The origins of the doctrine can be found in administrative review jurisprudence at the 
national level, of “every civil law jurisdiction”.137 The “most sophisticated and complex” 
of these doctrines have been developed in German administrative aw (“Ermessen- or 
Beurteilungsspielraum”), but this doctrine is far narrower than the doctrine as applied by 
the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR).
138
 The origin of the term “margin of 
appreciation” itself lies in French jurisprudence, where the Conseil d’Etat has used the 
term “margé d‟appréciation”.139 
 
The basis of the Court‟s application of the doctrine can be found in the Handyside 
judgment,
140
 where a publisher in the United Kingdom was held criminally liable for 
having in his possession a large quantity of an “obscene” book for publication for gain. 
The publisher claimed this was contrary to his right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
In that case the Court held that the second paragraph of Article 10 of the ECHR “leaves 
to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation. This margin is given both to the 
domestic legislator ("prescribed by law") and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that 
are called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force.” It further pointed out that “the 
machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national 
systems safeguarding human rights.”141 
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It then went on to limit the margin left to state. Because the Court is responsible for 
“ensuring the observance of the [State Parties´] engagements” it is also “empowered to 
give the final ruling on whether a „restriction‟ or „penalty is reconcilable with the” 
freedom or right protected by the ECHR.
142
 Importantly, “the domestic margin of 
appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision. Such supervision 
concerns both the aim of the measure challenged and its "necessity"; it covers not only 
the basic legislation but also the decision applying it, even one given by an independent 
court.” It was “in no way”, then, the task of the Court to “take the place of the competent 
national courts but rather to review” their decisions when exercising their power of 
appreciation.
143
 
 
Since the Handyside judgment, the Court has refined this doctrine further. There are 
variances in the width and precise content, however, according to which rights is at issue, 
the facts of the case, the justification of the respondent state, and so on.
144
 
 
4.3.1 The Margin of Appreciation in ECHR and general differences from the 
system of investment treaty arbitration  
 
The margin of appreciation can be defined – more thoroughly than above – as the 
freedom of states to act; a “maneuvering, breathing or „elbow‟ room, or the latitude of 
deference or error which the judicial organs will allow to national legislative, executive, 
administrative and judicial bodies before it is prepared” to regard an act or failure to act 
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attributable to the state in conflict with the requirements laid out by the relevant treaty as 
constituting a violation of one or more of the treaty‟s guarantees.145 
 
This very broad definition represents the different legal solutions underlying the doctrine 
as a label or umbrella. A court or tribunal can refrain from substituting its judgment for 
the judgment of the state on a particular matter under this label.
146
 It can also employ it as 
a way of saying that it finds the judgment of the state justifiable.
147
 In the former 
instances, the court or tribunal does not exercise judicial review at all; in the latter, 
judicial review is exercised, but no breach found. It is not always apparent which of the 
encompassed explanations is exercised in a particular application of the doctrine.
148
 
 
One of the underlying assumptions of this thesis is that the authority left to states by the 
ECtHR under the ECHR is larger than the one states have under international investment 
treaties. There are two main reasons for this assumption. 
 
Firstly, perhaps most importantly from a doctrinal legal perspective, the texts of the 
relevant provisions of the ECHR and investment treaties typically differ precisely in this 
manner. Take for example the protection against expropriation and the corresponding 
exception clauses of NAFTA Article 1110
149
 and the one found in Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the ECHR.
150
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Secondly, states sign human rights treaties for a variety of reasons,
151
 among them 
perhaps the desire for increased legitimacy in international politics. Yet, the regime of 
international human rights protection rests ultimately on the fragile edifice of state 
consent. If human rights courts and tribunals constantly rule against the policies of the 
signatories, the former run a risk of seeing their legitimacy wane, with state withdrawal 
from the treaty the ultimate peril. Perhaps this risk is mostly theoretical among 
democratic states. Perhaps it is less so among what one author has called “emerging 
authoritarian regimes.”152 Still, as argued above, the „margin of appreciation‟ doctrine of 
the ECtHR was developed at a time where its popularity was at a very low level, even 
among democratic states. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and the general principles of treatment provided in Article 1105; 
and (d) upon payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6.” 
150
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provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as 
it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”  
Compare the text of Article 6 of the Norwegian Model BIT Draft:  
“A Party shall not expropriate or nationalise an investment of an investor of the other Party except in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of 
international law 
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a Party to enforce such laws as 
it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”  
Apparently, the drafters thought it pertinent to look to the ECHR rather than other investment treaties for 
deciding the scope of the margin of appreciation for expropriations and nationalisations. Presumably, the 
case law of the ECtHR in this respect will provide considerable influence on arbitral tribunals deciding on 
the matter. One modest thrust of this thesis, however, is that a consequence of differences stemming from 
the treaties as such is that although the texts are more or less similar, likely outcomes can still disparate. Cf. 
chapter 4.4.2 below. 
See Elyse M. Freeman: ”Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Some Lessons from the 
European Court of Human Rights” 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2003-2004) 177-215, 200-
202, arguing that the outcome of the Methanex case (discussed below) would have gone in favour of the 
state had the claim been brought before the ECtHR, rather than before an ICSID tribunal. 
151
 This is an underdeveloped area of research, but see e.g. Oona A. Hathaway: "Why Do Countries 
Commit to Human Rights Treaties?" 51 Journal of Conflict Resolution, (2007), 588-621.  
152
 Azar Gat: “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers” 85 Foreign Affairs July/August 2007. 
 48 
 
Consent to international investment treaties, however, serve another (perceived) purpose, 
chiefly that of attracting FDI through adherence to the rule of law,
153
 not merely in 
abstracto but through substantive legal protection. If investment arbitrators rule against 
the state, however, this does not mean that state consent to the investment treaty is likely 
to be withdrawn, because the treaty can still serve the goal of attracting FDI. The 
investment treaty is not necessarily counter-productive for the state‟s interests even if a 
tribunal has awarded the private party compensation for its claims. I argued above that 
the system of investment treaty arbitration suffers from a widespread legitimacy deficit. 
If arbitral tribunals afford states a margin of appreciation, this deficit can, in part, be 
countered.
154
 
 
4.3.2 Protection of Property in the ECHR and the Margin of Appreciation 
It is somewhat contested whether the protection of property can be considered a human 
right proper,
155
 but property protection was nonetheless codified in Article 1 of the first 
protocol to the ECHR, which entered into force in 1954, not long after the Convention 
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itself.
156
 The essential object under protection of Article 1 is against unjustified 
interference by the State with the peaceful enjoyment of a person‟s possessions.157 
According to the provision, a deprivation of someone‟s possessions – and, consequently, 
an expropriation
158
 of property – must not occur unless a) it is in accordance with 
national law b) complies with “general principles of international law” and c) is “in the 
public interest”.159 
 
The ECtHR found in the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth that Article 1 “comprises three 
distinct rules.”160 The first of these, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is 
“of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of 
property.”161 In this context the Court will examine whether a proper balance has been 
struck between the demands of the community‟s general interest and the requirements of 
protecting the fundamental rights of the individual. When carrying out this evaluation it 
takes into account a domestic margin of appreciation to determine which measures are 
necessary in the general interest.
162
 
 
 The second rule, appearing in the second sentence of the first paragraph, “covers 
deprivations of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions”.163 A state interference 
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in the form of failing to compensate a deprivation of someone‟s possessions under the 
second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 with an “amount reasonably related to 
its value”, will normally be regarded as non-justifiable because of disproportionality.164 
Legitimate objectives of public interferences – “that most general phrase of all”165 – may 
provide for the justifiability of a reimbursement below full market value.
166
 This is an 
important aspect that distinguishes the utilization of the doctrine in human rights law 
from investment treaty arbitration, where the alternatives are full compensation or none at 
all.
167
 
 
The third rule, contained in the second paragraph, “recognizes that the States are entitled, 
amongst other things to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose,”168 granting 
States, in other words, a margin of appreciation in this respect. The Court recognizes a 
margin of appreciation both with regard to “choosing the means of enforcement and to 
ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest 
for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question.”169 
 
In Mellacher and Others v. Austria a similar argument was put somewhat otherwise: 
”[T]he legislature must have a wide margin of appreciation both with regard to the 
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existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of control and as to the 
choice of the detailed rules for the implementation of such measures.”170 This means that 
the Court will generally not review the factual basis on which the respondent took action 
against the possessions of the applicant.
171
 This rule is more akin to the awards regarding 
indirect expropriation, discussed below. 
 
The Court will scrutinize States‟ restrictions on the right to property with respect to the 
second paragraph of Article 1. There are three justification criteria that can be found here. 
 The lawfulness and purpose of the enforcement measures. 
 Their relationship to the aim of the law concerned, i.e. whether the legislation 
pursues a legitimate aim. 
 Whether the measures are going beyond or being disproportionate to their 
legitimate purpose. 
The intensity with which the Court reviews the restrictions on the rights to property in 
general seems rather low.
172 
Still, the measure of proportionality clearly differs in the 
application of the two rules.
173
 In respect of “control of use” regulations, the 
proportionality standard is even more “lax”, since “a deprivation [or expropriation] of 
property is inherently more serious than the control of its use, where full ownership is 
retained”174 
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4.3.3 The “Proportionality Test” in the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR with Regards 
to State Restrictions on the Right to Property 
As Cohen-Jonathan has noted, in view of diverse national policies and practices among 
Member States of the Council of Europe, Article 1 of the First Protocol provides a mere 
minimum standard.
175
 
 
For example, in James and Others, the Court asserts that it will respect the State‟s 
assessment “as to what is „in the public interest‟ unless that judgment be manifestly 
without reasonable foundation”.176 In other words, save in rare circumstances, in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR it is left to the national authorities to evaluate the 
proportionality of a specific measure restricting a person‟s right to property.  
 
The proportionality test of the ECtHR is distinctly context-sensitive, but there still are 
several considerations that clarify the content of the principle. Some of these are relevant 
in investment treaty arbitration as well. Firstly, it depends on the legitimate expectations 
of the owner: 
 
In Pine Valley v. Ireland, the Court argued that the applicants were involved in a 
“commercial venture which, by its very nature, involved an element of risk”.177 
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Furthermore, “they were aware not only of the zoning plan but also of the opposition of 
the local authority … to any departure from it.”178 Considering this lack of reasonable 
basis on which to base its claim, the Court held that the annulment of a permission 
without any remedial action being taken in their favour could not be regarded as a 
disproportionate measure against the applicants.179 
 
Secondly, it depends on whether the restriction imposed on the owner is an individual 
and excessive burden. In Lithgow v. United Kingdom, the Court argued, convincingly in 
my opinion, that there can be reason to differentiate between nationals and aliens 
regarding takings of property for the purpose of social reform or economic restructuring 
“as far as compensation is concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable 
to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have played no part in the 
election or designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption.”180 
 
In investment treaty arbitration this argument does not carry much punch. For one thing, 
the investor is always a foreigner, if the tribunal has any jurisdiction at all. But another 
matter is that, as mentioned before, the question of compensation in international 
investment law is an all-or-nothing paradigm. Therefore, a proportionality analysis that 
takes into account the fact that the Claimant is an alien is in reality answering the 
question of whether full compensation is due or not, rather than the proportionate size of 
the compensation. As the “foreign” quality of the investor is a requisite for jurisdiction, 
indeed, is the very rationale of the system, it does not seem logical that the same quality 
shall be evaluated in this other respect as well. Rather, because all compensable claims 
under international investment law would require that the Claimant is a “foreign 
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investor”, this quality is embedded into all the obligations for the host state of legal 
protection. For instance, if the question of whether a regulation amounts to expropriation 
prima facie depends on the owner of the investment out of which the dispute springs out 
being a foreigner (utilizing a proportionality test or not to make the actual decision), then 
this same quality cannot at the same time be decisive for the size of the compensation. 
 
Of a somewhat different nature is the argument that “although a taking of property must 
always be effected in the public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals 
and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear 
a greater burden in the public interest than non-nationals”.181 This is because, under 
investment treaty arbitration, this concept would not exclude a proportionality analysis 
from distinguishing between a non-compensable regulation and an expropriation on the 
grounds that it is not necessary reasonable that a foreign investor has to bear the burden 
alone for a public measure for which it is not eligible, e.g. a welfare scheme applying 
only to nationals but affecting its investment. 
 
Thirdly, one must assess the State's interest in the measure, e.g. so that it is suitable for 
the public purpose invoked. For example, in Mellacher, the Court found that a system of 
rent control that put some owners better than others was not disproportionate because a 
system aimed at “establishing a standard of rents for equivalent apartments at an 
appropriate level must, perforce, be general in nature. It would hardly be consistent with 
these aims nor would it be practicable to make the reductions of rent dependent on the 
specific situation of each tenant.”182 
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Fourthly, uncertainty is a factor that must be taken into account, “be it legislative, 
administrative or arising from practices applied by the authorities.”183 It is, furthermore, 
incumbent on the government “to act in good time, in an appropriate and consistent 
manner where an issue in the general interest is at stake.“184 
 
 
In the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth, the Court held that “in an area as complex and 
difficult as that of the development of large cities, the Contracting states should enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation in order to implement their town-planning policy.” Still, the 
Court could not “fail to exercise its power of review and must determine whether the 
requisite balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicants‟ right to „the 
peaceful enjoyment of [their] possessions‟”.185  
 
In this particular instance, Swedish expropriation legislation “created a situation which 
upset the fair balance which should be struck between the protection of the right to 
property and the requirements of the general interest: [the applicants] bore an individual 
and excessive burden which could have been rendered legitimate only if they had the 
possibility of seeking a reduction of … time limits or of claiming compensation. Yet at 
the relevant time Swedish Law excluded these possibilities and it still excludes the 
second of them”.186  
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In cases of deprivation of property, the “excessiveness” or reasonableness of the burden 
can be lessened where the claimant is compensated for the deprivation. Compensation is 
– crucially for the treatment of investment law below –one of the necessary requirements 
for deprivations of property in order to be in accordance with international law.
187
 
 
In Holy Monasteries the Court stated that “[c]ompensation terms … are material to the 
assessment whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance and, 
notably, whether it does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicants. In this 
connection, the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to 
its value will normally constitute a disproportionate interference and a total lack of 
compensation can be considered justifiable under Article 1 … only in exceptional 
circumstances.”188 It must be noted, however, that in the property protection provision of 
the ECHR, there is no guarantee for “a right to full compensation in all circumstances, 
since legitimate objectives of “public interest” may call for less than reimbursement of 
the full market value”.189  
 
As we shall see below, this possibility of sharing the burden of a measure between the 
investor (being reimbursed below full market value) and the community as a whole 
(being obliged to pay compensation) is a distinguishing factor between the ECHR and 
investment treaty arbitration, and it is of fundamental importance for the application of 
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the principle of proportionality in investment treaty arbitration and therefore also for the 
legitimacy of the system as a whole. 
4.4 Two concepts of the margin of appreciation and the relevance for 
investment treaty arbitration 
4.4.1 The substantive concept 
Two different uses of the margin of appreciation doctrine can be identified in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
190
 The first of these (“ the substantive concept”) is used to 
address the relationship between the freedom of the individual and collective goals. 
  
In all cases where an interference by the state with the freedom of the individual is 
established by the Court but not deemed to amount to a violation of a right, the role of the 
margin of appreciation (at least as a label) is to identify the point when an interference 
amounts to a violation. The most important criterion for identifying the distinction 
between a permissible and non-permissible interference is the principle of 
proportionality.
191
 In the words of one observer, this “non-absoluteness of the Convention 
freedoms [is] the main idea behind the substantive concept of the margin of 
appreciation.”192 
 
Of central importance to the issue at hand, is that the same criterion can (and does) also 
serve as an important tool for investment arbitration tribunals in similar situations, 
although not necessarily under the label “the margin of appreciation”. This is so because 
in these instances the ECtHR can be said to utilize the concept “to express a final 
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conclusion as to whether a particular interference with an individual right amounts to a 
violation all things considered, i.e. once the proportionality test has been applied.”193  
 
In his concurring opinion in Odievre v. France, Judge Rozakis remarked that the 
proportionality test (expressed as a necessity test) was for him “the crucial test to be 
applied in the circumstances of the case. Indeed, when … the Court has in its hands an 
abundance of elements leading to the conclusion that the test of necessity is satisfied by 
itself and embarks on a painstaking analysis of them, reference to the margin of 
appreciation should be duly confined to a subsidiary role.”194 In my view is this is a 
viable path, because the „margin of appreciation‟ as such must be said to lack any 
normative force.
195
 If the margin of appreciation is made for states to accommodate their 
sovereignty concerns, then they could do worse than integrating it with the principle of 
proportionality. 
 
4.4.2 The structural concept 
The second of these different usages of the margin of appreciation (“ the structural 
concept”) is used to address the degree of intensity of the Court‟s review as an 
international (and multilateral) adjudicator. This implies that it often defers to the 
judgment made by the national authorities, because it is not the role of the ECtHR to be a 
“fourth” national court.196 This role is reinforced by the importance of Article 26 of the 
ECHR (exhaustion of remedies) and the ECHR‟s (and the European Council‟s) key 
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function as harbinger and protector of democracy – a role ill-fated if the review of 
legitimate governmental acts are too strict. 
 
The approach taken by the ECtHR in striking the balance between the sovereignty of the 
states and its role as protector of the rights enshrined in the ECHR sometimes takes the 
form of a “consensus inquiry”.197 The Court then examines the “degree of consensus or 
harmony among the national laws of signatory states” in order to afford the respondent 
state a degree of discretion.
198
 In X. v. United Kingdom, it observed that there was “no 
common European standard with regard to the granting of parental rights to transsexuals. 
Since the issues in the case, therefore, touch on areas where there is little common ground 
amongst the member States of the Council of Europe, and, generally speaking, the law 
appears to be in a transitional stage, the respondent State must be afforded a wide margin 
of appreciation.”199 The margin of appreciation doctrine in these cases, as a “structural 
concept”, has less to do with the relationship between individual rights and collective 
goals than with that between the ECtHR and the state parties.
200
 
 
For this reason, it is submitted that the latter concept to little extent can be (or is) utilized 
by Arbitral Tribunals in the field of international investment law. This is a consequence 
of it not being the primary role of such tribunals to function as guardians of a multilateral 
international convention such as the ECHR. Rather, it is in this respect to fill the role of a 
proper and efficient court first instance,
201
 albeit one from which no right to appeal 
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emanates. This role of the Arbitral Tribunals should not, however, be understood as 
exercising the function of an administrative review body with the aim of ensuring that 
“municipal agencies perform their tasks diligently, conscientiously or efficiently. That 
function is within the proper domain of domestic courts and tribunals that are cognisant 
of the minutiae of the applicable regulatory regime.”202 For actions and omissions by the 
host state toward a foreign investor that do not reach the threshold of specific substantive 
provisions of the applicable investment treaty, then – for example regulations that limit 
the right of the investor to utilize its property but that do not amount to an expropriation – 
there is a margin of appreciation for the host government to undertake such regulatory 
measures it see fit.  
 
Depending of the investment treaty and the obligations it imposes on the state parties, a 
possibility below this threshold to be transformed into a violation of the investment treaty 
is for the Claimant to be denied justice before the local courts in a bona fide attempt to 
resolve its legal issues.
203
 
 
4.5 Criticism against the margin of appreciation doctrine 
In his partly dissenting opinion in the case of Z v. Finland, Judge de Meyer stated his 
belief that it was “high time for the Court to banish th[e] concept [of the margin of 
appreciation] from its reasoning. It has already delayed too long in abandoning this 
hackneyed phrase and recanting the relativism it implies.”204 
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Eyal Benvenisti argued some years ago that the universal aspirations of the ECHR and 
other human rights bodies were “to a large extent compromised by” the margin of 
appreciation doctrine,
205
 characterizing it as a principled recognition of “moral 
relativism”.206 “Absent political influence and faced with prevalent resentment, 
minorities rely upon the judicial process to secure their interests.”207 
 
 
Furthermore, a continued usage of the margin of appreciation in a manner consistent with 
what I called the substantive concept, makes it in danger of danger of becoming “the 
source of a pernicious 'variable geometry' of human rights, eroding the acquis of existing 
jurisprudence and giving undue deference to local conditions, traditions and practices. 
That danger will be exacerbated with the enlargement of the Convention by the new 
democracies.”208 
 
In the wake of the Court's judgment in Müller, it was written that:  
"If an interference as extreme as the confiscation of an artist's works is regarded as within 
the wide margin of appreciation, it is difficult to imagine a case in which European 
supervision is likely to be real and effective where a work is regarded by the national 
authorities as obscene or otherwise injurious to public morals."
209
  
 
This is not as important in investment arbitration as it is in the ECHR. But the rather 
extensive fragmentation in the jurisprudence of Arbitral Tribunals with respect to indirect 
expropriation, as will be shown below, may both stem from and lead to increased 
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difference in “cultural, economic and legal concepts of property, different understandings 
of state role, and general heterogeneity in State practice.”210 
 
Suppose that a competent state agency grants a foreign investor a long-term concession to 
establish and operate a casino. The foreign investor has similar investments in other 
states, protected by similar investment treaties concluded by its home state. After 
establishment of the casino, an election takes place and a new government takes charge, 
seeking to “get rid of immoral practices, such as prostitution, alcohol consumption and 
gambling,”. Shortly thereafter, the authorities revoke the concession in order to protect 
the public morale, subsequently denying the investor compensation for the loss of the 
right to utilize the property. 
 
Is this a factor that can be taken into account? In a similar case, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) held that: 
“[M]oral, religious and cultural factors, and the morally and financially harmful 
consequences for the individual and society associated with gamingand betting, could 
serve to justify the existence on the part of thenational authorities of a margin of 
appreciation sufficient to enable themto determine what consumer protection and the 
preservation of publicorder require” 211 
I find it hard to believe that a similar approach would have been taken by an arbitral 
tribunal, as this approach should be labeled under the “structural concept” outlined above. 
In any case, I believe such an approach could compromise the way international 
investment agreements limit the risk taken by investors when planning and carrying out 
decisions to invest in a foreign country. A consequence could be that investors become 
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more hesitant in investing in countries where the domestic rule of law is fragile or 
underdeveloped. 
 
4.6 Conclusion – The rationale of a margin of appreciation in 
investment treaty arbitration. 
 
Supposedly, a sovereign state‟s competence to regulate the activities of a foreign investor 
is subject, theoretically, to that state‟s ”unlimited discretion”, in practice controlled only 
by a minimum standard of treatment.
212
 When that state is party to one or more 
international investment treaties, its discretion becomes limited instead. When its 
discretion is challenged by a foreign investor in an arbitral tribunal, the crucial question is 
how much deference the arbitral tribunal should pay to the respondent state‟s claim that a 
particular regulatory measure falls within the scope of permitted measures of the 
applicable international investment treaty.
213
 
 
The question, then, is whether that initial determination is subject to full substantive and 
conclusive review by arbitral tribunals charged with settling a dispute, or if assertions by 
national authorities that a state action was covered by an NPM clause deserve some 
degree of deference, with the result that tribunals will undertake something less than full 
substantive review?
214
  
 
This is, in fact, a specific application of a more general question of international law, 
namely, the international relevance of a party‟s domestic determinations. The basic rule, 
of course, is that domestic determinations based on internal law that an act is not 
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wrongful or otherwise excused cannot be adduced as proper justification for the non-
performance of international legal obligations.
215
 
 
As the ILC has pointed out, the basic rule of the irrelevance of domestic determinations 
may be modified by way of relevant primary rules and states can and do provide in their 
treaties for different levels of deference to their own domestic determinations.283 
5 The Margin of Appreciation in and indirect expropriation  
 
5.1 Expropriation in International Law 
 
As I have noted earlier,
216
 states can lawfully expropriate the investment of foreigners 
under international law, provided that the action meats certain criteria:
 217
  
1) The measure must serve a public purpose,  
2) It must not be discriminatory or arbitrary (within the generally accepted 
meaning of the terms) 
3) It must be in compliance with due process of law and  
4) Compensation that is prompt (without undue delay), adequate and effective (in 
a freely convertible currency) must offered the foreign investor.  
The issue of expropriation of property belonging to an alien – both direct and indirect – 
has long been hotly debated as a matter of international law.
218
 These controversies 
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pertained chiefly to ideological differences and as a feature of post-colonialism.
219
 
Notably, the so-called “Calvo Doctrine” stated that international law required states only 
to treat domestic investors no better than foreign investors.
220
  
 
In the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatinom the Supreme Court of the United 
States stated that there “are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion 
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state‟s power to expropriate the property of 
aliens.”221 Andreas Lowenfield has observed that this conclusion – from a legal point of 
view – cannot stand today.222 
 
Still, there are controversial issues in customary international law relating to the 
expropriation of foreign investments. These include even such basic questions as: to what 
extent does international law, rather than the legislation of the host state, govern 
expropriation? How is compensation to be determined? An investment treaty resolves 
these issues as between the parties by regulating the conditions under which 
expropriation may be carried out and compensation awarded.
223
  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how and in what way the qualifications 
investment treaties lay upon states’ rights under international law to regulate within their 
own jurisdiction are limited by the margin of appreciation left those states by arbitral 
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tribunals. I argue that these limits, in turn, are qualified by the principle of 
proportionality. 
 
As will be shown below, in Methanex v. United States and Saluka v. Czech Republic the 
Tribunals applied the some of the criteria above – which determine whether an 
expropriation is legal or not – in order to establish whether an expropriation had occurred 
in the first place.”224 Not many Tribunals have seemed to follow the same path 
afterwards, however. 
 
For the ECtHR, the case law of international courts and tribunals has been understood as 
leaving any State with: 
“a sovereign power to amend or even terminate a contract concluded with private 
individuals, provided it pays compensation. … This both reflects recognition that 
the superior interests of the State take precedence over contractual obligations and 
takes account of the need to preserve a fair balance in a contractual 
relationship”225 
The same is not necessarily true in the field of international investment law, but it is 
probably safe to assume that the nationalizing or regulating “State has wide margins of 
discretions in determining what is necessary on the grounds or reasons of „public utility, 
security or the national interest‟, or for the purpose of „safeguarding the natural 
resources‟”,226 although the level of necessity sometimes must stand against the scrutiny 
of an arbitral tribunal.  
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5.2 Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitration  
Often, the measures or inactions by a government equivalent to expropriation toward a 
foreign investor do not involve formal transfer of title from the latter to the former. 
Indeed, although direct takings may have become unfashionable,
227
 there "are countless 
more subtle ways in which a country which refrains from outright seizure and which 
vigorously disavows any intention to expropriate, many, none the less, very seriously and 
perhaps irremediably interfere with the use of property." That is, measures that do not 
qualify as direct expropriations can still be regarded as indirect expropriations. It should 
be noted that a certain measure cannot at the same time amount to both direct and indirect 
expropriation, because these legal categories differ both in nature and extent.
228
  
 
The issue of indirect expropriation, then, according to one seasoned observer, currently 
constitutes “the single most important development in state practice”229 A measure, a 
series of measures or omissions amounting to indirect expropriation can involve any 
unreasonable restriction on the utilization, control, enjoyment or disposal of the 
investment “as to justify an interference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, 
enjoy or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of 
such interference.”230 However, it is not disputed under international law whether such de 
facto or indirect expropriations, can be subject to expropriation claims.
231
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Correspondingly, most investment treaties protect against unlawful indirect 
expropriation, without, however, defining what it means. It is therefore largely left to 
Arbitral Tribunals to do so, looking to international law.
232
 According to the Tribunal in 
Parkerings-Compagniet v. Lithunia, indirect expropriation can be described “as the 
negative effect of government measures on the investor‟s property rights, which does not 
involve a transfer of property but a deprivation of the enjoyment of the property.”233 
 
A striking feature of indirect expropriation claims is that the act or omission by 
government with the de facto effect of expropriating property, is often not, at least not 
explicitly, intended to do so by the government. Put differently, a failure by a court or 
tribunal to find mens rea, as it were, does not exclude a finding of indirect expropriation. 
Two well-known classics of international law jurisprudence, The Norwegian Claims and 
the German Interests in Polish Upper Silisia cases, illustrate this point: ”a State may 
expropriate property, where it interferes with it, even though the State expressly disclaims 
any such intention.”234 Taken together, these cases show ”that even though a State my not 
purport to interfere with rights to property, it may, by its actions, render those rights so 
useless that it will be deemed to have expropriated them.”235 As will be shown below, 
one is more likely than not to find contemporary investment treaty awards that resemble 
these positions, but a shift to what I believe is a somewhat more nuanced approached can 
be traced recently. At the moment, then, the jurisprudence of international courts and 
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tribunals regarding indirect expropriation can perhaps best be described as fragmented 
and inconsistent.
236
  
 
The lack of coherently developed international case law regarding indirect expropriation 
is probably related to “the extremely complex facts ordinarily involved” and to "the 
truism that judgments of this kind commonly depend on highly subjective responses to 
the fact patterns discerned."
237
  
 
Absent compensation, the legal question is, just as Gordon Christie wrote in 1962, 
whether the restrictions in question “taken together amount to expropriation”.238 As we 
shall see below, this is the question of the drawing of the line between non-compensable 
regulatory actions by government and measures that amount to indirect expropriation. 
 
In cases of indirect expropriation the government will typically not admit that an 
expropriation has occurred. Consequently, it will refrain from paying compensation to the 
investor.
239
 As noted above, compensation is one of the criteria for lawful expropriation. 
Measures that amount to indirect expropriations will therefore generally be unlawful.
240
 
The question which standard of compensation follows from establishing that measures by 
a government amounts to unlawful indirect expropriation under international law 
compared to the compensation that is due as part of lawful expropriation, is largely 
unresolved.
241
 This author is sympathetic to the view of Dolzer and Schreuer:
242
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illegal expropriation will be regulated by the general laws of state responsibility. As far 
as possible, the damages should restore the situation prior to wrongful acts.
243
 
Compensation for lawful expropriation (market value) can yield a very different result 
from damages under the laws of state responsibility.
244
 
 
As will be shown in detail below, in order to prevent what has been called “abuse of the 
public interest doctrine,”245 the proportionality test of the ECtHR has been introduced in 
some of the awards concerning the deprivation by government of an investment 
belonging to a foreign investor. According to this principle, regulation must, inter alia, 
comply with standards of reasonableness, among which must be counted a sound 
scientific basis for the necessity of the measure.
246
 
 
5.2.1 Creeping expropriation 
 
NAFTA Article 1110(1) and several other investment treaties distinguish between direct 
or indirect nationalization or expropriation on the one hand and measures tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation on the other.
247
 An indirect expropriation, therefore, “is 
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still a taking of property. By contrast where a measure or a series of measures tantamount 
to an expropriation is alleged, there may have been no actual transfer, taking or loss of 
property by any person or entity, but rather an effect on property which makes formal 
distinctions of ownership irrelevant.”248 
 
Measures that fall under this second category of Article 1110 (1) are often described as 
“creeping”, “disguised”, “de facto” or “constructive” expropriations.249 They are 
comprised of a several elements, none of which can separately constitute a breach of 
international law. The factors that can constitute creeping expropriation  “include non-
payment, non-reimbursement, cancellation, denial of judicial access, actual practice to 
exclude, non-conforming treatment, inconsistent legal blocks, and so forth.”250  
 
This cumulative element of the creeping expropriation was stressed in the case of Tradex 
v. Albania:  
“none of the single decisions and events alleged by Tradex to constitute an expropriation 
can indeed be qualified by the Tribunal as expropriation, it might still be possible that, 
and the Tribunal, therefore, has to examine and evaluate hereafter whether the 
combination of the decisions and events can be qualified as expropriation of Tradex‟ 
foreign investment in a long, step-by-step process by Albania.” 251 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
(2005), Article 5 (”expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
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There is a wide range of arbitral practice concerning the topic of creeping expropriation. 
In Biloune, a private investor was renovating and expanding a resort restaurant in Ghana. 
The arbitration panel held that a series of acts and omissions attributable to the 
Government of Ghana, which “effectively prevented” Mr. Biloune, a Syrian national, 
from pursuing his investment project, constituted a “constructive expropriation.” Each of 
these actions, viewed in isolation, may not have constituted expropriation. But the sum of 
them caused an “irreparable cessation of work on the project.”252 
 
In Siemens v. Argentina, the Tribunal described creeping expropriation as by definition 
referring to: 
“a process, to steps that eventually have the effect of an expropriation. If the process 
stops before it reaches that point, then expropriation would not occur. This does not 
necessarily mean that no adverse effects would have occurred. Obviously, each step must 
have an adverse effect but by itself may not be significant or considered an illegal act. 
The last step in a creeping expropriation that tilts the balance is similar to the straw that 
breaks the camel‟s back. The preceding straws may not have had a perceptible effect but 
are part of the process that led to the break.”253 
 
5.2.2 Distinguishing regulation from expropriation. 
How to draw the line between non-compensable regulatory measures and compensable 
expropriation is today “on of the biggest challenges for arbitrators as well as for 
academics.”254 As a starting point, the question of analysis in cases of indirect 
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expropriation is if an expropriation has occurred, i.e. whether the actions or inactions by a 
government amount to that level, rather than the legality of the expropriation per se. This 
is because it is normally not difficult to determine whether the criteria for lawful 
expropriations are fulfilled – especially whether the investor has received 
compensation
255
 – but quite another task to assess whether the measure, a series of 
measures, an omission or a series of omissions in complicated cases amount to 
„expropriation‟ or „measures which have equivalent effects‟ or other standards used in 
investment treaties.
256
 
 
This problem of the distinction between ordinary regulation and compensable or unlawful 
expropriation is not confined to the realm of international law. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the developments of expropriation laws on the international level is based on, and 
largely resembles, domestic laws.
257
 In the United States this problem has been 
characterized by some writers as a “muddle”.258 Due to the extraordinary wide array of 
differing factual contexts in which the issue can arise, the search for a grand theory for 
deciding when a bona fide public purpose regulation becomes compensable (unlawful) 
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expropriation under international investment law is perhaps less likely to be successful 
than is quoting Justice Potter Stewart: “I know it when I see it”.259 
 
Absent compensation, the legal question is, just as Gordon Christie wrote in 1962, 
whether the restrictions in question “taken together amount to expropriation”.260 As we 
shall see below, this is the question of the drawing of the line between non-compensable 
regulatory actions by government and measures that amount to indirect expropriation. 
 
President Higgins has formulated what is still a powerful explanation of this problem: 
Is this distinction intellectually viable? Is not the State in both cases (that is, either 
by a taking for public purpose, or by regulating) purporting to act in the common 
good? And in each case has the owner of the property not suffered loss? Under 
international law standards, a regulation that amounted (by virtue of its scope and 
effect) to a taking, would need to be "for a public purpose" (in the sense of in the 
general, rather than for a private interest). And just compensation would be due.
261
 
We shall see below that this problem is not, in fact, unsolvable, but that the available 
solutions under most current investment treaties, are perhaps not fully satisfying.  
5.2.2.1 The “sole effect test” 
The competence of States to take regulatory action aimed at the general welfare of the 
state or parts of it can be regarded as its “police powers”. These can be defined inter alia 
as its power to place restraints on the property rights of legal and natural persons “for the 
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protection of the public safety, health and morals or the promotion of the public 
convenience and general prosperity”.262 
 
In the language of investment treaties, this power bears a close resemblance to the 
requirements for undertaking expropriations of the property of foreign investors. In other 
words, the lawfulness of such actions or omissions is conditioned on them being part of 
the exercise of police powers. When such actions or omissions amount to indirect 
expropriation, their lawfulness is also conditioned on due compensation.  
 
Citing scholarship from a time span of 30 years, Christopher Schreuer concluded that 
“[t]here is broad consensus in academic writings that the intensity and duration of the 
economic deprivation is the crucial factor in identifying an indirect expropriation or 
equivalent measure.”263 The question is, as we shall see, whether these are the only 
relevant factors. 
 
Under such an approach, the more or less noble intentions of the State for undertaking the 
measure are largely irrelevant for the finding of an expropriation. If the measure reaches 
the threshold of intensity and duration, then it amounts to an expropriation. An 
unequivocal statement of this position was given by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in 
Phelps Dodge Corp. et al., v. The Islamic Republic of Iran. The Tribunal stated that it did 
not fail to comprehend why the Iranian government felt compelled to protect its interests 
through a transfer of management, and the it understood “the financial, economic and 
social concerns to which it acted, but those reasons cannot relieve the Respondent of the 
obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge for its loss.”264 
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A more detailed exploration of how Arbitral Tribunals utilize this approach to distinguish 
between regulations and expropriations follows below. First, however, I will introduce 
another approach aimed at resolving this issue. 
 
5.2.2.2 The police powers exception 
Another approach to distinguish a non-compensable regulation from a compensable 
deprivation is to regard actions that fall within the scope of the bona fide non-
discriminatory exercise of police powers as non-compensable.
265
 In Too v. Greater 
Modesto Insurance Associates
266
 the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal denied the claim of an 
Iranian national that seizure and subsequent disposal of his liquor license by the U.S. 
government to cover overdue withholding taxes amounted to expropriation, because this 
was held to be within the state's police powers:  
”[A] state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage 
resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is commonly accepted 
as within the police power of States, provided it is not discriminatory and is not designed 
to cause the alien to abandon the property to the State or to sell it at a distress price.”267 
One question that is pertinent from the perspective of the margin of appreciation doctrine, 
is whether a Tribunal is prepared to review whether the action was in reality bona fide,
268
 
or, simply let the test formulated by Justice Antonym Scalia be decisive: “whether the 
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legislature has stupid staff”,269 in the sense that articulating a regulatory purpose is not 
difficult.
270
 
 
For instance, a measure, such as health legislation in the form of quarantines, even 
though the State claims it is necessary, can in reality be imposed with ”the unavowed ... 
purpose of ruining a foreign trader.”271Presumably, for such a claim to be examined, not 
to say held, by a Court or Tribunal, there must be some kind of indication that it is the 
case. It is reasonable that the burden of establishing this lies upon the claimant. In the 
above mentioned case of Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates, the Tribunal 
denied the Claimant‟s allegations precisely because he did not suggest that the ”tax levy 
was imposed against him because he was an Iranian national. Nor [did] the Claimant 
[prove] that the IRS deliberately intended to cause him to abandon the property to the 
State or to sell it at a distress price.”272 
 
A few international cases concern the scope of the State's police power, but no accurate  
definition is given. In The Oscar Chinn Case, the Permanent Court of Justice observed 
that: 
“no enterprise … can escape from the chances and hazards resulting from general 
economic conditions. Some industries may be able to make large profits during a period 
of general prosperity, or else by taking advantage of a treaty of commerce or of an 
alteration in customs duties; but they are also exposed to the danger of ruin or extinction 
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if circumstances change. Where this is the case, no vested rights are violated by the 
State.”273 
 In Kügele v. Polish state, the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal dismissed claimant‟s 
allegations that license fees imposed by the Polish government had forced him to close 
his brewery, thereby amounting to an expropriation of his property.
274
 In Sea-Land 
Service v. Iran, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal held that regulations by the government of 
Iran on what kind of cargo could be unloaded by the claimant were reasonable and 
legitimate during a time of civil unrest.
275
 
 
The issue has also been addressed in contemporary investment treaty arbitration. In 
Feldman v. Mexico, the Tribunal made it clear that: 
“governments must be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the 
environment, new or modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government 
subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the 
like. Reasonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business 
that is adversely affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that customary 
international law recognizes this”.276 
Similarly, in Saluka v. Czech Republic, the Tribunal was of the opinion that there was 
“ample case law” in support of the view that a principle of contemporary customary 
international law states “that a State does not commit an expropriation and is thus not 
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liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts general 
regulations that are „commonly accepted as within the police power of States‟”.277 
 
Yet, this wide power of governments to regulate must be viewed in the light of the fact 
that “much creeping expropriation could be conducted by regulation, and a blanket 
exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole in international 
protections against expropriation.”278 This approach is, in itself, therefore not particularly 
helpful in our search for the limits of these powers. 
5.2.3 The consequences of the two approaches and variations of them 
These are the two main approaches taken by for adjudicators to decide whether a State‟s 
regulatory actions, omissions affecting or taken against a foreign investor or his property 
amounts to „expropriation‟. One of the main differences between these two general 
approaches that can be found in recent practice of investment treaty tribunals dealing 
with the problem of distinguishing regulation from expropriation, is that one of them 
leaves governments a certain (relative) margin of appreciation, the other not. 
 
Where the wording of the relevant legal texts, for example the BIT between the foreign 
investor‟s home state and the host state, indicate preference for one particular approach, 
there is a reasonable, legal basis for choosing this approach for the adjudicator.
279
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For instance, the treaties that contain the formula “measures which have an effect 
equivalent to [expropriation]”, will typically lead to an Arbitral Tribunal applying the 
“sole effect test”, under which a purported regulation is turned into an expropriation 
“when it interferes unduly with the investment itself or with the investor‟s legitimate 
expectations with respect to the investment.”280 In determining whether a taking 
constitutes an „indirect expropriation‟, it is particularly important to examine the effect 
that such taking may have had on the investor‟s rights. Where the effect is similar to what 
might have occurred under an outright expropriation, the investor could in all likelihood 
be covered under most BIT provisions”281 For instance, the Tribunal in Tecmed v. 
Mexico, observed that “the effects of the actions or behavior under analysis are not 
irrelevant to determine whether the action or behavior is an expropriation. Section 5(1) of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
According to Annex B, Article 1, Article 6(1) is intended to reflect customary international law concerning 
the obligation of States with respect to expropriation
.
 Article 4 reads:  
“The second situation addressed by Article 6(1) is known as indirect expropriation, where an action or 
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the agreement confirms the above, as it covers expropriations, nationalizations or…any 
other measure with similar characteristics or effects...”282 
 
Indeed, it has been argued that there can be no serious doubt that the magnitude of the 
effect upon the legal status and the ability of the investor to fully utilize and enjoy its 
property is a central factor whether a regulatory measure is in fact an expropriation. The 
controversy, however, surrounds “the question of whether the focus on the effect will be 
the only and exclusive relevant criterion, or whether the purpose and the context of the 
governmental measure may also enter into the takings analysis.”283  
 
This broad approach is the aim of treaties that include an explanatory annex – such as the 
Model BITs of the United States and Canada and BITs based on these – be regarded as a 
deliberate shift by the treaty makers away from the “sole effect test”, presumably because 
this test leave little or no discretion at the hands of the regulating government in order to 
undertake such bona fide regulations it deems necessary, once the regulations reach a 
certain threshold.
284
 Norway‟s recent Model BIT reinforces this impression.285 The 
wording of these treaties seem to leave a quite wide margin of appreciation for the 
government in the context of regulatory actions “that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives”.286 
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One potential problem that might follow is increasing heterogeneity in the scope and 
character of the protection offered against indirect expropriation in investment treaties.
287
 
From a democratic perspective – or more precisely the perspective of national 
sovereignty in the sense of judicial control – this problem is perhaps hardly one at all, at 
least not one of particular magnitude. In any case, it clearly embodies the search for a 
balance between national policy goals and international judicial review. Furthermore, it is 
a problem that does not have to run counter to the objective of investment treaties of 
attracting FDI, provided, perhaps, that enough states that compete for the same foreign 
investors follow the same approach and that arbitral tribunals charged with the task of 
deciding on such matters on the basis of such investment treaties adopt a sensible 
approach. We shall se below how this issue has been resolved in recent investment treaty 
arbitration. 
 
When, as is often the case, the wording of the relevant legal document gives no particular 
indication, it is to a large extent left up to the adjudicators which among the different 
approaches to assessing governmental regulatory conduct against foreign investors will 
be chosen. The outcome, however, can be very different. If the effect of the State‟s action 
or omission against a foreign investor or the investor‟s property is the sole measure with 
which to decide whether it amounts to a taking, there seems to be little room for a 
“margin of appreciation” doctrine. 
 
The comprehensive body of case law in the field of indirect expropriation, has not 
resolved all legal issues. As indicated above, there is a conspicuous lack of agreement 
among arbitral tribunals as to whether, as noted by the Tribunal in Telenor v. Hungary, 
”the intention or objectives of the government in introducing the measures may also be 
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taken into account or whether the sole criterion is the effect of the government 
measures”.288 
 
The Tribunal in SD Myers v. Canada noted that whereas the possibility that regulatory 
conduct by public authorities could be subject of legitimate complaint under Article 1110 
of the NAFTA should not be ruled out, it was unlikely to be deemed so.
289
 Under this 
approach, the distinction between regulation and expropriation can be regarded as a 
matter of degree: “Expropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights; 
regulations a lesser interference”.290 This distinction “screens out most potential cases of 
complaints concerning economic intervention by a state and reduces the risk that 
governments will be subject to claims as they go about their business of managing public 
affairs.”291 
 
However, it is an open question how helpful this distinction is as a general rule. As I have 
indicated above, “recognizing direct expropriation is relatively easy: governmental 
authorities take over a mine or factory, depriving the investor of all meaningful benefits 
of ownership and control.” But, in the words of the Tribunal in Feldman v. Mexico, “it is 
much less clear when governmental action that interferes with broadly-defined property 
rights crosses the line from valid regulation to a compensable taking, and it is fair to say 
that no one has come up with a fully satisfactory means of drawing this line.”292 
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Although it still, therefore, can be claimed that large lacunae remain with regards to 
establishing what is regulation and what is indirect expropriation,
293
 some helpful 
characteristics can be drawn from recent awards of Arbitral tribunals. As will be shown 
below, one can benefit from a more a more accurate taxonomy of the two approaches I 
have outlined. The aim of this systematic approach is to provide an analytical tool for 
exploring the indirect expropriation jurisprudence of Arbitral Tribunals with a view to the 
margin of appreciation. 
 
We saw above that the principle of proportionality can be regarded as the flip side of the 
margin of appreciation coin. The question of the “sole effect test” versus the police 
powers approach is in reality the question of the relevance of this coin as a tool for 
resolving complex cases affecting both society and foreign investors; for allocating 
adverse affects of necessary regulation and therefore also a question of allocating risks. 
Only the mixed approach utilizes proportionality as a tool to distribute this burden. 
 
5.3 Situating the applicability of the “margin of appreciation” 
doctrine: The sole effect test or a variant of the police powers 
approach? 
5.3.1 The purpose of the regulator: The intention to deprive the investor of his 
property or enrich the regulator 
In the case of Sea-Land Service Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal held that a ”finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, that the 
Tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate governmental interference with the conduct 
of Sea-Land‟s operation, the effect of which was to deprive Sea-Land of the use and 
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benefit of its investment.”294 Purportedly, this view has not been upheld in later awards 
by the Tribunal.
295
 In its decision, the Tribunal referred to the Oscar Chinn Case of the 
PCIJ as well as to doctrine.
296
 The relevant passage of the scholarly article cited does, 
however, not seem to support the view of the Tribunal: ”The Norwegian Claims and the 
German interests in Polish Upper Silesia cases show that a State may expropriate 
property, where it interferes with it, even though the State expressly disclaims any such 
intention.”297 
 
The paragraph of the Sea-Land Award quoted above was later cited in CME Czech 
Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic as authority for a finding of an expropriation.
298
  
 
In Siemens v. Argentina the Arbitral Tribunal found that para 270 Argentina has argued 
against taking into consideration only the effect of measures for purposes of determining 
whether an expropriation has taken place. The Tribunal recalls that Article 4(2) refers to 
measures that “a sus efectos” (in its Spanish original) would be equivalent to 
expropriation or nationalization. The Treaty refers to measures that have the effect of an 
expropriation; it does not refer to the intent of the State to expropriate. The quotation of 
the finding of the PCA in Norwegian Shipowners refers to “whatever the intentions” of 
the US were when the US took the contracts. A different matter is the purpose of the 
expropriation, but that is one of the requirements for determining whether the 
expropriation is in accordance with the terms of the Treaty and not for determining 
whether an expropriation has occurred.
299
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This approach will leave a wide discretion at the hand of the sovereign state to undertake 
any such non-deliberate interferences it may wish, without it ever amounting to an 
expropriation. Presumably, any general regulations that affect not only the foreign 
investor but also other legal subjects would then be permissible, regardless of the effect 
on the foreign investor. Exceptions are conceivable, e.g. where the general regulation, 
such as a ban for environmental or health reasons affecting a product manufactured by 
the foreign investor when similar products with essentially the same qualities – except 
foreign ownership – are not affected.300 
5.3.2 The effect of the measures: The “sole effect” doctrine301 
A more common approach taken by Arbitral tribunals is concerned not so much with the 
intention of the regulator, as with the effect the regulatory actions have. These effects can 
be either upon the investment or upon the investor. Under this approach the intentions of 
the regulator become largely irrelevant; rather, the level of interference will be measured 
to determine whether the actions constitute an indirect expropriation that requires 
compensation to be legal. Nor does it seem to be much room for a proportionality 
analysis under this approach. The result is that whether or not the regulation was taken to  
 
Whatever the basis and justification of the „sole effect doctrine‟ may be it is plausible that 
a balancing concept, may, in such areas as environmental law, yield results different from 
those reached under an analysis focusing only on the effect of the measure.
302
 For 
example, in Compañiá del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v. Costa Rica the Tribunal stated 
that: 
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While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking 
for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was taken for 
this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be 
paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the 
Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate 
compensation must be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the 
environment makes no difference.
303
 
The Tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico considered the question of the meaning of the 
purpose of a regulation where it is undertaken for environmental reasons. In that case, 
one of the questions was the effect of an Ecological Decree, issued by a local governor 
after arbitral proceedings under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA were initiated and three days 
before the expiry of his term. The decree declared a Natural Area for the protection of 
rare cactus. The Natural Area encompassed the area of the property of the investor. The 
Tribunal gave an often-quoted obiter dictum: 
Although not strictly necessary for its conclusion, the Tribunal also identifies as a further 
ground for a finding of expropriation the Ecological Decree issued by the Governor of 
SLP on September 20, 1997. This Decree covers an area of 188,758 hectares within the 
“Real de Guadalcazar” that includes the landfill site, and created therein an ecological 
preserve. This Decree had the effect of barring forever the operation of the landfill. … 
The Tribunal need not decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the 
Ecological Decree. … However, the Tribunal considers that the implementation of the 
Ecological Decree would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to 
expropriation.
304
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This is presumably based on the view that the bona fide public purpose of the regulation 
is a condition of the legality of an expropriation. In cases regarding indirect 
expropriation, the question is rarely whether the expropriation was legal or not, because 
that would require compensation. If no compensation has been paid to the investor by the 
state for a regulatory act that amounts to a taking of the investment, it can hardly be 
regarded as legal even if the basis of the regulation is a legitimate public purpose. Under 
this approach, the crucial question is therefore whether the act as such amounts to a 
taking of the investment. 
 
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal similarly held in Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic 
republic of Iran that it ”need not determine the intent of the Government of Iran” because 
”a government‟s liability to compensate for expropriation of alien property does not 
depend on proof that the expropriation was intentional.”305 
 
When analyzing whether the effects amount to a deprivation, the question is, therefore, 
whether the investor has been deprived in whole or in significant part of the use or of the 
legitimately expected economic benefit of its investment.
306
 
 
According to the decisions of arbitral tribunals, there are two important factors in this 
consideration: The intensity of the measure and the duration of the measure. 
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5.3.2.1 Effect on the investment – Partial and full deprivation 
This factor scrutinizes the intensity of the interference of the measure with the 
investment. The intensity of the interference is intrinsically linked to the effect that the 
measure has on the investment.
307
 In Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA, the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal decided that there was no basis for the automatic and immediate conclusion that 
an investment had been taken by the government even though control over property is 
taken by the government, but ”such a conclusion is warranted whenever events 
demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it 
appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral.”308  
 
Similarly, in Starrett Housing Corp v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it held 
that although there was no direct taking in the case, international law recognizes  
”that measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that 
these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, 
even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the 
property formally remains with the original owner.”309 
 
In Metalclad v. Mexico, the Tribunal declared that expropriation under NAFTA includes: 
“also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be 
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expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the 
host State.”310 
 
In Pope & Talbot v. Canada, a company registered in the United States had acquired a 
Canadian wood products company through a Canadian subsidiary. The company operated 
lumber mills which manufactured and sold softwood lumber, mainly to the United States. 
In 1996 the United States and Canada entered into the Softwood Lumber Agreement, a 
bilateral treaty that established a limit on the free export of softwood lumber 
manufactured in certain Canadian provinces into the United States. The investor's 
softwood lumber manufacturing took part in one of these provinces. Subsequently, 
Canada placed softwood lumber on an Export Control List, meaning that fee-based 
export permits were required for each exportation to the United States. Pope & Talbot 
claimed that the manner of Canada's implementation of the treaty constituted a breach of 
its obligations under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, inter alia in the sense that it "deprived 
the Investment of its ordinary ability to alienate its product to its traditional and natural 
market." in violation of Article 1110 of the NAFTA.
311
 The Respondent asserted that the 
implementation was an exercise of police powers which, under international law, did not 
require a state "to compensate an investment for any loss sustained" so long as the 
regulatory measure imposed was non-discriminatory.
312
 
 
Although the Tribunal acknowledged that it must be particularly careful when analyzing 
the exercise of police powers, it could not give a "blanket exception for regulatory 
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measures”, as this would create a gaping loophole in international protection against 
expropriation.
313
 Therefore, the Export Control Regime was not beyond the coverage of 
Article 1110. The Tribunal then decided that for an expropriation to occur, there must 
have been a “substantial deprivation” of the investment.314 This results in that light from 
depriving the investor of the control of the investment, managing the day-to-day 
operations of the company, arrest and detention of company officials or employees, 
supervision of the work of officials, interfering in the administration, impeding the 
distribution of dividends, interfering in the appointment of officials and managers, or 
depriving the company of its property or control in total or in part.
315
 
 
In the question of whether Article 1110 was violated, the Tribunal formulated the test 
"whether the interference is sufficiently restrictive to support the conclusion that the 
property has been 'taken' from the owner.
316
 
 
In Telenor v. Hungary, the Tribunal examined the level of interference necessary to 
constitute expropriation and formulated a similar test: “in the present case at least, the 
investment must be viewed as a whole and that the test the Tribunal has to apply is 
whether, viewed as a whole, the investment has suffered substantial erosion of value.”317 
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Also in the recent Vivendi v. Argentina the Tribunal followed this approach. The 
reasoning implies that the Tribunal was looking to earlier precedent, or at least it seems 
clear that the Tribunal regarded earlier awards as authority for its own view: 
“Numerous tribunals have looked at the diminution of the value of the investment to 
determine whether the contested measure is expropriatory. The weight of authority ... 
appears to draw a distinction between only a partial deprivation of value (not an 
expropriation) and a complete or near complete deprivation of value (expropriation).”318 
The Tribunal went on to declare incorrect the proposition of the Respondent that an act of 
state must be presumed to be regulatory, absent proof of bad faith. It came to this 
conclusion as there was “extensive authority for the proposition that the state‟s intent, or 
its subjective motives are at most a secondary consideration.”319 
 
Presumably, there will be little room for the principle of proportionality under this 
approach, as the level of interference will not be compared to the importance of the 
regulation in an attempt to balance interests, but simply scrutinized with regards to how 
far it goes in depriving the investor of the economic benefits from his property. Awarding 
a certain amount of compensation, like under the ECHR, is not possible.
320
 
5.3.2.2 Duration of a Measure 
The second factor of the “sole effects doctrine” is the duration of the measure. As 
indicated above, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal observed that a deprivation, to be 
regarded as an expropriation, must not only be sufficiently intense, but in addition “not 
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merely ephemeral.”321 Similarly, in CME v. Czech Republic, an expropriation was found 
because, as a consequence of sufficiently intense actions and inactions attributable to the 
government, there was “no immediate prospect at hand that CNTS will be reinstated in a 
position to enjoy an exclusive use of the licence as had been granted under the 1993 split 
structure.”322 
 
Put generally, and – as a temporal requirement – rather more strict, the Tribunal in LG&E 
v. Argentina stressed the necessary permanency of an expropriation as a main rule: “it 
cannot have a temporary nature, unless the investment‟s successful development depends 
on the realization of certain activities at specific moments that may not endure 
variations.”323 A similar statement on the temporal factor was given by the Tribunal in 
BG Group Plc v. Argentina.
324
 Here, however, the Tribunal did not include the caveat of 
LG&E. In light of the other awards cited in this chapter, I believe the general relevance of 
this statement is limited. In S.D. Myers v. Canada, the same consequence was said to 
require, usually, “a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic 
rights although it may be that, in some contexts and circumstances, it would be 
appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial 
or temporary.”325 
 
Investment treaty tribunals have reiterated and clarified this temporal element in the 
assessment of whether an expropriation has occurred in several awards, but findings of 
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course vary much on the particular circumstances.
326
 For instance, for the state to allow 
an entity "to seize and illegally possess the hotels for nearly a year is more than an 
ephemeral interference” in the utilization or enjoyment of that property,327 amounting 
thereby to a deprivation of fundamental rights of ownership “so profound that the 
expropriation was indeed a total and permanent one.”328 In Middle East Cement Shipping 
and Handling v. Egypt, an export license that was suspended for four months deprived 
the investor of rights it had been granted under the License in such a way that it 
constituted an expropriation.
329
  
 
It follows that certain interferences by the state of an investment are permissible as non-
compensable regulations, even though their intensity rises to the threshold of 
expropriation, as long as the duration of the measure is sufficiently brief. The 
consequence is that even under this approach, regulatory measures of expropriatory 
intensity are available, gratis, as it were, for the government. However, I do not view this 
temporal element as a margin of appreciation left governments under investment treaties, 
but rather as intrinsic to the concept of expropriation. 
5.3.3 The purpose of the interference 
In recent awards, some investment tribunals have followed another approach, possibly 
due to an increasing number of claims based on indirect expropriation against measures 
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allegedly undertaken to protect or promote public welfare.
330
 This approach, then, shifts 
focus away from the effects on the investment to the needs of the state to be able to carry 
out measures to reach legitimate aims. 
 
Of importance for our purposes, this approach can be divided into two, based, it seems, 
on the importance the Tribunal will place on the public welfare state versus the rights of 
the investor. 
 
5.3.3.1 The radical police powers approach331 
Under this approach, an arbitral tribunal will seek to establish whether the measure serves 
a legitimate public purpose. If that can be established, the measures will not be regarded 
as an expropriation, regardless of their severity.
332
 Consequently, no compensation or 
damages will be due to the investor. It follows, then, that the tribunal have given the State 
a very wide margin of appreciation in terms of deciding and implementing measures for 
the general public good, even if the measure deprives a foreign investor of its investment. 
All kinds of judicial review are not abandoned, though. It is not sufficient with merely an 
explanation by the government after the fact.
333
 The tribunal will supervise that the 
regulation is bona fide and, it will scrutinize the evidence provided by the respondent, 
such as whether it is based on sound scientific reasoning. 
 
In the case of Methanex v. the United States,
334
 a Canadian methanol producer, 
Methanex, claimed compensation of approximately US $ 970 million under Chapter 11 
of the NAFTA following a ban on the sale and use of a gasoline additive called MTBE in 
the State of California. Methanol was used as feedstock for the MTBE. California argued 
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that banning MTBE was necessary because the additive was contaminating drinking 
water supplies, and therefore posed a significant risk to human health and safety, and the 
environment. 
 
Methanex claimed that a “substantial portion of its investments, including its share of the 
California and wider US oxygenate markets, was taken by a discriminatory measure and 
handed to the US domestic ethanol industry”, which could have the same function as 
MTBE. Allegedly, this was tantamount to expropriation within Article 1110 of the 
NAFTA. It also submitted that the various exceptions listed in Article 1110 had not been 
met, inter alia that “the US measures were not intended to serve a public purpose”.335 
 
The Tribunal ruled that there had been no expropriation. This finding was based partly on 
a thorough review of the scientific evidence, including a report by scientists at the 
University of California, produced by the Respondent in support of the necessity of the 
ban. The Tribunal accepted the report “as reflecting a serious, objective and scientific 
approach to a complex problem in California.”336 In response to the Claimant‟s argument 
that the report was “art of a political sham by California”, the Tribunal mentioned in 
particular that it was subjected at the time to public hearings, testimony and peer-review; 
and its emergence as a serious scientific work from such an open and informed 
debate”.337 It therefore concluded that the ban was “motivated by the honest belief, held 
in good faith and on reasonable scientific grounds, that the MTBE contaminated 
groundwater and was difficult and expensive to clean up.” 338  
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The Tribunal held that under general international law, a non-discriminatory regulatory 
measure undertaken for a public purpose, enacted in accordance with due process, and 
affecting “inter alios a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and 
compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating government 
to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would 
refrain from such regulation.”339 
 
The approach taken by Methanex was novel because the Tribunal chose to apply the 
criteria normally used to determine whether an expropriation is legal or not in order to 
establish whether an expropriation had occurred or not.
340
 The award was soon 
criticized.
341
 A year after, however, an UNCITRAL tribunal took a similar approach in 
the case of Saluka v. Czech Republic. 
 
In 1990, when the Communist period in Czechoslovakia ended, reorganization and 
privatization of the formerly centralized banking sector followed. Saluka Investments BV 
(Saluka), incorporated in the Netherlands, but owned by a Japanese company, Namura, 
had been established in 1998 with the purpose of holding the shares in one of the big four 
Czech banks, IPB.
342
 
 
By mid-1998 the Czech banking sector was in serious economic difficulties, mainly 
stemming from “the existence of a large bad debt problem, inadequate provision for 
creditors to enforce the rights to recover their loans, and the tough new regulatory steps 
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taken by the Czech National Bank [CNB]”343 among which demand from CNB for a 
fixed capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of minimum 8 % caused problems for the banks.
344
 
30. August 1999, the CNB began a regulatory inspection of IPB. It discovered serious 
financial deficiencies and irregularities. CNB concluded that the financial state of IPB 
directly endangered “the stability of the banking system of the Czech Republic.”345 While 
the other three banks received financial assistance, this was not offered IPB, resulting in a 
forced administration of the company, and subsequently, it was taken over by another 
bank, CSOB. 
 
The tribunal reviewed the evidence provided by CNB and found that the measures were 
justified under Czech law. It “enjoyed a margin of discretion in the exercise” of its 
responsibility when faced with the facts in the case, i.e. the grave financial situation of 
the IPB and the equally grave potential consequences.
346
 
 
The Tribunal further observed that there is no clear agreement in international law as to 
when a permissible regulation becomes a compensable expropriation. For that reason, it 
noted, it “inevitably falls to the adjudicator to determine whether particular conduct by a 
state „crosses the line‟ that separates valid regulatory activity from expropriation.”347 
Without analyzing the matter any further, the Tribunal simply went on to conclude that 
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“the Czech Republic had not „crossed that line‟ and did not breach Article 5 of the 
Treaty, since the measures at issue can be justified as permissible regulatory actions.”348 
 
I do not contest that the Czech government should enjoy a margin of discretion for how 
to regulate complex financial matters that threaten the stability of the national banking 
system, a vital area for the national economy and therefore also, in a broad sense, national 
security. For the tribunal, however, this discretion was confined within the following 
limit: “It is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay 
compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory 
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed 
at the general welfare.”349 Thus, how and when there is a limit to the severity upon the 
investment of the non-compensable regulatory measures, is left unanswered, leaving the 
State with a wide margin of discretion. 
5.3.3.2 Effect on the investor – the meaning of legitimate expectations  
 At last as important as the effect of a governmental measure on private property is its 
effect on the investor, that is, the extent to which the measure may undermine the 
investor‟s reasonable and legitimate expectations represented by the investment. Indeed, 
legitimate expectations are inseparable from the concept of private property rights.
350
 
 
Whenever an investor decides to invest in a foreign country, it takes into account the 
general legal framework available in terms of property and contractual rights, procedural 
obstacles for access to court et cetera. Together with the specific actions or omissions on 
behalf of the host government with the purpose or reasonable understanding that it was 
intended to create a commitment toward the foreign investor or its investment – such as 
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concessions, licenses, letters of intent, contractual agreements et cetera – this general 
legal framework engenders the basis of the investor‟s expectations. From a legal 
perspective, such factors create the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the investor.  
 
These have been defined as relating to a situation where the conduct of a state ”creates 
reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in 
reliance on said conduct, such that a failure by” said state ”to honor those expectations 
could cause the investor (or investment) to suffer damages.”351 These expectations are 
very important when interpreting the standard of fair and equitable treatment,
352
 but they 
also play a role in arbitral awards concerning indirect expropriation.
353
 
 
Whenever an investor decides to invest in a foreign country, it is the general legal 
framework and the specific commitments at the time of the investment that make up its 
legitimate expectations. Any subsequent changes to this regime whether in general or 
specific within the normal procedural standards of the host state, such as e.g. a general 
increase in the tax rate of exports on a certain kind of natural resources, are unlikely to be 
regarded as constituting a breach of the investor‟s legitimate expectations, sans any 
evidence to the contrary, such as “undertakings and assurances given in good faith” by 
the host state to the foreign investor as an inducement to its “making the investment 
affected by the action.”354  
                                                 
 
351
 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Arbitral Award, 26 
January 2006, para. 147. 
352
 See International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Separate 
Opinion para. 21-118; Alvik (2006) 262-280 and Dolzer & Schreuer (2008) 133-140. 
353
 Alvik (2006) and Dolzer & Schreuer (2008) 104-106. 
354
 Revere Copper v. OPIC, Award, 24 August 1978, 56 International Law Materials (1980) 258. The case 
concerned a company that, prior to investing in Jamaica, had been given by the government an explicit 
ceiling for 25 years on the taxation of all profits and a provision in the investment contract that read: ”No 
further taxes will be imposed on bauxite, bauxite reserves, or bauxite operations, or any assets used in 
bauxite operations or dividends on bauxite operations.” The government later sought to nullify this 
contract. The Arbitral Tribunal held that by doing so, it had violated international law. See also EnCana 
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A breach of a contract between the foreign investor and the host state by the latter does 
not in it self necessarily imply a violation of the legitimate expectations of the former that 
constitutes an expropriation. Whether that is the case, depends on whether the contract is 
breached in the capacity of sovereign state or in the capacity of party to a contract.
355
 It is 
therefore typically regulatory measures and other exercises of governmental authority 
that amount to expropriations. As the Tribunal said in Metalclad v. Mexico: “These 
measures, taken together with the representations of the Mexican federal government, on 
which Metalclad relied, and the absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis for the 
denial by the Municipality of the local construction permit, amount to an indirect 
expropriation.”356 
 
In the context of the margin of appreciation, these cases indicate that this margin is 
qualified to the extent of which legitimate expectations are created by the host state and 
relied on by the investor. Public purpose regulations are, to some extent, not legitimate 
insofar as they violate explicit agreements between the investor and the host state to the 
contrary, absent compensation. 
 
Another qualification that imposes a duty on the host state, narrowing the margin of 
appreciation, is the duty to satisfy the tribunal that the purpose of the regulation is 
genuine. Merely referring to “public interest” will not magically put such interest into 
existence and therefore satisfy this requirement. If this were so, this requirement would 
be rendered meaningless since one hardly “can imagine no situation where this 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, UNCITRAL (Canada/Ecuador BIT), 
Award, 3 February 2006, para. 173. 
355
 Azurix v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (United States/Argentina BIT), Award, 14 
July 2006 
356
 Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1. (NAFTA). Award, 30 August 2000, 
para. 107. My emphases. 
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requirement would not have been met.”357 That being said, the review of the public 
interest requirement does not appear to be very strict.
358
 The Restatement of the Law of 
Foreign Relations of the United States argues that this requirement “has not figured 
prominently in international claims practice, perhaps because the concept of public 
purpose is broad and not subject to effective reexamination by other states.”359  
 
The result of such a “radical police powers” approach to indirect expropriation in general 
can be said to have adverse consequences for the system of investment treaty arbitration 
as such. The approach leads to a fragmentation within investment law between direct and 
indirect expropriations. In case of a direct expropriation compensation will be due. In 
case of a regulatory interference no compensation will be required even if the purpose of 
the interference and the effect of the interference are the same.
360
 
5.3.3.3 The balanced police powers approach 
This approach is largely a combination of the sole effect doctrine and the radical police 
powers approach, outlined above. Both purpose and effect will be taken into account. The 
question is the relationship between these two factors. 
 
The Tribunal in Feldman v. Mexico chose a route that can be distinguished from those in 
the previous chapter. Pointing to the exceptions provided in Article 1110 a-d of NAFTA, 
it concluded that absent expropriatiory action: 
”factors a-d are of limited relevance, except to the extent that they have helped to 
differentiate between governmental acts that are expropriation and those that are not, or 
are parallel to violations of NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1105. If there is a finding of 
                                                 
 
357
 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/16 (Cyprus/Hungary BIT) Award, 2 October 2006, para. 433 (obiter dictum). 
358
 Such findings are very rare. Dolzer & Schreuer (2008) 111. 
359
 American Law Institute: Restatement of the Law Third, the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
(American Law Institute Publishers 1987), Section 712, Comment g, cited in Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1. (NAFTA), Award on Merits, 16 December 2002, para. 99. 
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expropriation, compensation is required, even if the taking is for a public purpose, non-
discriminatory and in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1).”361 
This reasoning implies that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the factors a-d play a dual 
role. They are both the criteria for a legal expropriation and help, in some way, 
differentiate between governmental acts that constitute expropriation and those that do 
not. The Tribunal did not elaborate any further on the relationship between these two 
roles of the four factors, but at least left an indication that the purpose, most importantly, 
of a measure is not irrelevant to determine whether it constitutes an expropriation, but, 
perhaps, that it plays a limited role.
362
 
 
The Tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada took a similar approach, including the unclear 
relationship between the purpose and the effect of a measure in the determination of 
whether it amounts to an expropriation. A tribunal should not, it argued “be deterred by 
technical or facial considerations from reaching a conclusion that an expropriation or 
conduct tantamount to an expropriation has occurred. It must look at the real interests 
involved and the purpose and effect of the government measure.”363 
 
5.4 Nuancing the purpose approach by the Proportionality Test and 
limiting the margin of appreciation 
As a result of the different approaches laid examined in this chapter, In the case of 
Tecmed v. Mexico, the Claimant, a Spanish company, had acquired by a Mexican public 
auction a hazardous industrial waste landfill in 1996. The rights and obligations to the 
landfill were held by Cytrar, a subsidiary company of Tecmed. In 1994 Mexican 
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 Kriebaum (2007) 726. 
361
 Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1. (NAFTA) Award on Merits, 16 December 2002, 
para. 98. 
362
 See note 337 above. 
363
 S.D. Myers para. 285, cf. para. 281. 
 104 
environmental authorities (The National Ecology Institute, hereinafter refereed to as 
“INE”) gave authorization for the landfill to operate for an indefinite period of time.364 
When the landfill was transferred to Cytrar, the company was given authorization to 
operate the landfill until 19 November 1998, at which time such authorization could be 
extended every year at the applicant‟s request.  
 
On 25 November 1998, however, INE rejected the application for renewal of the 
authorization, causing Tecmed to seek damages in an investment tribunal under the BIT 
between Spain and Mexico. The Tribunal concluded that the primary motivation for the 
rejection of the authorization was “related to social or political circumstances”.365 It 
rejected Mexico‟s grounds for the refusal as either baseless or that the issue had been 
remedied. Importantly, the Tribunal also found that there was no evidence that the site 
posed any danger to human health or the environment. 
 
The main question with regard to the rejection of renewed authorization was whether, due 
to this rejection the assets involved lost their value or economic use for Tecmed and the 
extent of the loss.
366
 In the Tribunal‟s view, this distinction was important to distinguish 
between a regulatory measure, whereby the State exercised its legitimate police powers, 
and a de facto expropriation that deprived the assets and rights involved of any real 
substance.
367
 The Tribunal found “undoubtedly” that the rejection had negative effects on 
Tecmed‟s investment and “[a]s far as the effects of such [rejection] is concerned, the 
decision [could] be treated as an expropriation under [the applicable BIT between Spain 
and Mexico].” 
                                                 
 
364
 Ibid, para. 36.  
365
 Ibid, para 132. 
366
 Ibid, para. 115. (With reference to the Partial Award in the case of Pope Talbot Inc v. Government of 
Canada, 102-104, pp. 36-38) 
367
 Ibid 
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5.4.1 Introducing the proportionality test in investment treaty arbitration 
The Tribunal considered it also necessary to evaluate not only the effect but also the 
intent or characteristics of the rejection.
368
 Furthermore, to the knowledge of this author 
for the first time in any investment treaty decision, the Arbitral Tribunal introduced a 
“proportionality test”, in this context a rather innovative methodological approach as a 
means to distinguish between compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable 
regulation. This approach is well known in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
369
 
 
From the viewpoint of the ECtHR this principle implies that a proportionate balance must 
be struck between the means employed and the aim pursued so that the rights of 
individuals are not overburdened in return for social goods.
370
 The Court will evaluate the 
importance of the general public interest in question. A highly important public need will 
weigh in the balance of whether a control of the use of property should be regarded as 
justifying a regulatory burden without compensation.”371 This proportionality principle 
can be considered the “other side of the margin of appreciation. It is suggested that the 
principle of proportionality should be deployed as a technique to decide whether national 
authorities have overstepped their margin of appreciation. In my view it is perhaps just as 
suitable to regard characterize the proportionality test as a corrective of the margin of 
appreciation. The more intense the standard of proportionality becomes, the narrower the 
margin allowed to national authorities. If a reasonable or fair balance is found, the 
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 Ibid, para 118. 
369
 The Tribunal referred to Matos e Silva, LDA., and Others v. Portugal, Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 
Pressos Compañia Naviera and Others v. Belgium and James and Others v. United Kingdom. 
370
 See chapter 4.3.3 above. 
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 Helen Mountfield: “Regulatory Expropriations in Europe: The Approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights”11 New York University Environmental Law Journal (2002) 136-147. 
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national authorities are considered to remain within the bounds of appreciation.”372 The 
rationale of the principle is thus to balance conflicting benefits.
373
 
 
To determine whether Mexico‟s regulatory actions or measures were to be characterized 
as expropriatory, it was not sufficient merely to assess the impact of the regulatory 
actions, but also necessary to consider “whether such actions or measures [were] 
proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection 
legally granted to investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact 
has a key role upon deciding the proportionality.
374
 
 
The tribunal acknowledged that a due deference must be shown “when defining the 
issues that affect its public policy or the interests of society as a whole, as well as the 
actions that will be implemented to protect such values”.375 
 
The concept of “due deference” is known from the municipal legal systems of both 
England and the United States and from the ECtHR
376
 If due deference is granted, it can 
imply that the framers of a legal document did not intend to give the judiciary wide-
ranging authority to review all aspects of the decisions made by a decision making body 
whose decisions the judiciary was set to review.
377
 In other words, the original competent 
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decision maker is granted discretion – or a „margin of appreciation‟ – within the 
boundaries of which as a starting point the judiciary will not exercise a strict review. 
 
However, in the opinion of the Arbitral Tribunal, this did not prevent it from examining 
the actions of Mexico in light of article 5 (1) of the BIT to determine whether its 
measures were “reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation of economic rights 
and the legitimate expectations of [those] who suffered such deprivation.”378 In order to 
determine whether such measures were reasonable, the Tribunal stated that “[t]here must 
be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to 
the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”379 
In other words, the principle of proportionality qualifies the “dueness” of the deference or 
limits the margin of appreciation. It is probably for this reason one scholar recently 
claimed that the application of the principle of proportionality “means that the 
sovereignty of the host country will be challenged”.380 
5.4.2  Balancing the margin of appreciation 
In my view, the passage cited above certainly implies that the Arbitral Tribunal 
acknowledged that a certain margin of appreciation is left to State parties of investment 
agreements (and whereas I do not consider this controversial, the opposite would 
certainly be), but does it clarify the meaning of this margin of appreciation to a helpful 
extent? 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
question presented.” In the context of the ECtHR, see Karatas v Turkey [1999] IV ECtHR 81, at 120, Joint 
Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Pastor Ridruejo, Costa and Baka: “In the assessment of 
whether restrictive measures are necessary in a democratic society, due deference will be accorded to the 
State‟s margin of appreciation; the democratic legitimacy of measures taken by democratically elected 
governments commands a degree of judicial self-restraint”. 
378
 Tecmed, para 122. 
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The Tribunal held that it was “irrefutable that there were factors other than compliance or 
non-compliance by Cytrar [the subsidiary of Tecmed] with the Permit‟s conditions or the 
Mexican environmental protection laws and that such factors had a decisive effect in the 
decision to deny the Permit‟s renewal”.381 In conclusion, “the reasons that prevailed in 
INE‟s decision to deny the renewal of the Permit were reasons related to the social or 
political circumstances and the pressure exerted on municipal and state authorities and 
even on INE itself created by such circumstances.”382 
 
For the Tribunal to determine whether the Resolution was proportional to the deprivation 
of the Cytrar‟s rights and with the negative economic impact on the Claimant that arose 
from this deprivation, these reasons as a whole had to be evaluated. If not, it would be 
established that the Respondent had acted in breach of the BIT.
383
There was no reason to 
doubt that considerable community pressure had existed. The question was whether this 
pressure was “so great as to lead to a serious emergency situation, social crisis or public 
unrest”. 
 
In order to assess the proportionality of the action adopted with respect to the purpose 
pursued by such measure, this factor had to be measured against the economic impact of 
the government action that deprived the Claimants of its investment with no 
compensation whatsoever.
384The Tribunal held that the political pressure in sum “did not 
give rise to a serious urgent situation, crisis, need or social emergency that, weighed 
against the deprivation or neutralization of the economic or commercial value of the 
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Claimant‟s investment, permits reaching the conclusion that the Resolution did not 
amount to an expropriation under the Agreement and international law.”385 
 
Or, to put it somewhat crudely, the end did not justify the means. Therefore, the Tribunal 
concluded, “the Resolution and its effects amount to an expropriation in violation of 
Article 5 of the Agreement and international law.”386 It sees reasonable to assume, 
however, that had the political pressure given rise to a “serious urgent situation, crisis, 
need or social emergency”, the principle of proportionality as a technique for balancing 
the competing values of the community and the individual had allowed for more far-
reaching action by the Respondent, thus granting it a wider margin of appreciation under 
the BIT. 
 
The case of Azurix v. Argentina was allegedly the first award concerning disputed water 
privatization that was decided on the merits,
387
 a U.S. based water company claiming $ 
600 million in compensation for losses related to Buenos Aires Province‟ measures. The 
claim was only partially allowed by the tribunal, awarding Azurix USD 165 million. 
From a legal point of view the award provides inter alia to the understanding of the 
concept of regulatory expropriation, in which regard the Claimant‟s argument was 
dismissed by the tribunal. It did, however, note that this specific method “provide useful 
guidance for purposes of determining whether regulatory actions would be expropriatory 
and give rise to compensation”388 
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As in the cases of Feldman and S.D. Myers, the Tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina
389
 
emphasized that the question for deciding in matters of expropriation “remains as to 
whether one should only take into account the effects produced by the measure or if one 
should consider also the context within which a measure was adopted and the host  
State‟s purpose.”390 
 
It then went on to observe the importance of not counfounding the State‟s right to adopt 
policies with its power to take an expropriatory measure. It indicated that states generally 
have a large margin of appreciation in with respect to “measures having a social or 
general welfare purpose. In such a case, the measure must be accepted without any 
imposition of liability, except in cases where the State‟s action is obviously 
disproportionate to the need being addressed.”391 This is an approach very similar to the 
one with saw from the ECtHR above, but the Tribunal did not need to look that far: “The 
proportionality to be used when making use of this right was recognized in Tecmed,” as 
we saw above, thereby paving the way for the utilization of these principles. 
 
Still, under the current system, a proper balance of interest is not possible because the 
final result is always "all or nothing": The tribunal must either find that an expropriation 
has taken place, with due compensation; or that no compensation has taken place, with no 
compensation. A proportionate balance of interest is therefore not possible under this 
approach.
392
 Either the investor gets full compensation or it gets nothing. 
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6 Conclusion. Proposals for Treaty Design 
 
It is not the primary role of international adjudicators to release a sovereign state from the 
treaty obligations to which the state has consented to be legally bound, even if the 
consequence of the treaty obligation is a negative one, and even if it is subject to public 
resentment by a large majority of the state‟s constituency.393 This would mean to assign 
responsibility ex post facto to a tribunal rather than ex ante to the treaty makers or the 
consenting sovereign state that is failing to comprehend or predict what it is consenting 
to. A performance of good faith by the acting state is a condition for precluding review of 
regulatory acts by a court or tribunal under the margin of appreciation.
394
 However, 
absence of good faith by the state actor can in practice be less decisive for the perceived 
legitimacy of a legal regime, such as investment treaty arbitration, than a specific 
outcome, i.e. the result in the awards produced.
395
 This is important because most 
regulation that results in expropriation  “occur not with central government authorities, 
which are conscious of international obligations, but with lesser governmental units, local 
states, municipalities and the like.”396 Municipal authorities that execute regulations with 
effects contrary to norms of international law in order to obstruct the interests of 
transnational companies and promote those of local people are villains only in the tales of 
lawyers and shareholders. Investment treaties should be fashioned so as to optimize the 
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feasibility of taking legitimate concerns into account, while not forgetting the purpose of 
attracting FDI.  
 
This is linked to the issue of compensation. The trend in the last years have been for most 
treaties to include the standard of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
397
 In 
light of the development we have seen in recent arbitral awards perhaps the best proposal 
is to reduce full compensation (or enhance partial compensation). This can be done 
through the tools that are already available, proportionality and the margin of 
appreciation aspects by taking into account ”the relative legitimacy or the state‟s 
regulation (intention, good-faith, legitimate purposes pursued) on one hand, and the 
investor‟s special hardship (disappointment of legitimate expectation on property; good-
faith efforts to come to a solution; time and trouble to find a replacement purpose for the 
property or finding another property) on the other”,398 in other words, altering the 
compensation regime so that the principle of proportionality can be applied in a way 
similar to the ECtHR: As a tool for sharing the burden of a measure. I believe this 
solution take into account the conflicting interests better than the current approaches do.  
 
The result for can be that limited regulations that are beneficial, but not strictly necessary 
-and therefore today will be avoided for fear of  having to pay full market value in 
compensation - can be undertaken if the benefit achieved by the regulation exceeds the 
cost of partial compensation.  
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Changes that result in comprehensive changes affecting many investors, such as 
transition from monarchy to republic,
399
 or changes that affect only a few investors in 
extraordinary ways, can be disproportionate the other way around. If the costs for 
compensation are very high, such measures can impose unreasonable burdens on the 
authorities. A partial compensation to the investor can lessen the burden. 
 
For investors such an approach would mean that there is lesser risk for being deprived of 
the investment entirely, without compensation. Partial compensation would mean that 
arbitral tribunals could find that an expropriation had occurred more often. The cost 
would be that fewer investor would be compensated with the full market value of the 
investment. Legitimacy-wise, I believe this approach to be more beneficial than the 
current. 
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